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Taming Madison’s Monster: How to Fix SelfExecution Doctrine
David L. Sloss ∗
INTRODUCTION
In the Federalist Papers, James Madison invited readers to
consider the hypothetical case of a federal constitution that provided
for the supremacy of state law over federal law. In that case, he said,
[T]he world would have seen, for the first time, a system of
government founded on an inversion of the fundamental principles
of all government; it would have seen the authority of the whole
society everywhere subordinate to the authority of the parts; it
would have seen a monster, in which the head was under the
direction of the members. 1

The modern doctrine of non-self-executing treaties (NSE doctrine)
illustrates the problems posed by Madison’s hypothetical monster.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín v. Texas is an
example. 2 The United States has a treaty obligation under Article 94
of the UN Charter “to comply with the decision of the International
Court of Justice [(ICJ)] in any case to which it is a party.” 3 When
President Truman ratified the Charter in 1945, after the Senate
voted 89-2 in favor of ratification, the United States made a binding
commitment to comply with ICJ decisions. 4 Since the Charter was

∗

Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison).
2. 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
3. U.N. Charter art. 94, ¶ 1.
4. See 91 CONG. REC. 8,190 (1945) (roll call vote in U.S. Senate).

8.SLOSS.AA (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/3/2016 11:26 AM

2015

ratified, neither Congress nor any President has repudiated that
commitment. At issue in Medellín was the ICJ decision in the
“Avena case,” where the ICJ ordered the United States to provide
judicial hearings for fifty-one Mexican nationals on death row in the
United States. 5 Medellín was one of the named Mexican nationals;
he was on death row in Texas. President Bush directed State courts
to “give effect to the [Avena] decision . . . in cases filed by the 51
Mexican nationals addressed in that decision.” 6 However, Texas
defied the President’s order and the U.S. Supreme Court allowed
Texas to do so. The Court based its decision on the distinction
between “self-executing” and “non-self-executing” treaties; 7 it held
that Article 94 of the UN Charter is not self-executing. As a result of
Medellín, the United States stands in ongoing violation of a legally
binding treaty commitment, but no national political authority ever
decided to violate the treaty. Thanks to Medellín and to the
transformation of NSE doctrine after World War II, 8 Madison’s
monster has come to life. The head is under the direction
of the members.
On the other hand, perhaps the head retains control. Even after
Medellín, Congress could enact legislation requiring Texas and other
states to comply with the Avena decision or with ICJ decisions
generally. Several bills to that effect have been proposed, but
Congress has not enacted such legislation. 9 The central problem is
congressional inertia; recently, Congress has been so deeply divided
that it is difficult to pass any new federal legislation.
By holding that Article 94 is not self-executing, the Court
effectively barred judicial enforcement of Article 94, absent
congressional legislation. By barring judicial enforcement, the Court

5. Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J.
Rep. 12 (Mar. 31).
6. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 503.
7. See id. at 504–23.
8. See infra notes 90–105 and accompanying text (discussing the transformation of
NSE doctrine after World War II).
9. See Steve Charnovitz, Correcting America’s Continuing Failure to Comply with
the Avena Judgment, 106 AM . J. I NT ’L L. 572, 576−79 (2012) (discussing bills
introduced in Congress).

1692

8.SLOSS.AA (DO NOT DELETE)

1691

5/3/2016 11:26 AM

Taming Madison’s Monster

virtually guaranteed noncompliance: because the Avena judgment
requires the United States to provide judicial hearings for the named
Mexican nationals, Article 94 requires the United States to comply
with Avena and congressional inertia makes it very difficult to pass
the requisite legislation. Conversely, if the Court in Medellín had
held that Article 94 is self-executing, Congress could have enacted
legislation to bar judicial enforcement of Article 94, but it would
have needed to overcome congressional inertia to do so. Absent
legislation, state courts would have been required to apply the Avena
decision, thereby promoting treaty compliance. 10 Therefore, NSE
doctrine is consistent with federal political control, at least in theory,
because Congress could reverse the practical effect of a holding of
self-execution, or a holding of non-self-execution, by enacting
appropriate legislation.
The key words in the previous sentence are the words “in
theory.” To confront Madison’s monster, we must move from theory
to practice. In practice, judicial application of NSE doctrine is almost
entirely arbitrary. Courts decide whether a treaty is self-executing by
invoking the “intention” of the treatymakers. 11 In the vast majority
of cases, that “intention” is purely fictitious, a judicial fabrication. If
a court finds that the treatymakers intended the treaty to be selfexecuting, it places congressional inertia on the side of compliance.
But if the court finds that the treatymakers intended the treaty to be
non-self-executing, it places congressional inertia on the side of noncompliance. Since the courts do not want to admit that they are
making decisions about treaty compliance, they hide behind a
fictitious “intent of the treatymakers” to evade responsibility for their

10. The Court said in Medellín that a holding of non-self-execution “would eliminate
the option of noncompliance,” 552 U.S. at 511, but that statement is incorrect. Just as
Congress could enact legislation to require judicial enforcement to overcome a holding of
non-self-execution, Congress could also enact legislation to bar judicial enforcement to
overcome a holding of self-execution.
11. See id. at 505 (stating treaties “are not domestic law unless Congress has either
enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be ‘selfexecuting’”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111(4) (AM. LAW INST.
1986) (stating that an international agreement is non-self-executing “if the agreement
manifests an intention that it shall not become effective as domestic law without the enactment
of implementing legislation”).
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decisions. Insofar as state courts engage in this behavior, Madison’s
monster is real. However, federal court decisions applying the
fictitious intent test are more numerous than state court decisions. 12
Therefore, in practice, the main problem involves a transfer of power
over treaty compliance decisions from the federal political branches
to federal courts. Since federal courts are not politically accountable,
decisions about whether to comply with national treaty obligations
are being made by government actors who lack political
accountability. Treaty violations by state and local government officers
are largely a consequence of federal court decisions applying a fictitious
intent test to justify a holding that a treaty is not self-executing.
This Article analyzes the development and application of the
fictitious intent test that is the cornerstone of modern NSE doctrine;
I focus on the practical implications of the fictitious intent test for
the supremacy of treaties over state law. The analysis is divided into
four parts. Part I distinguishes among three distinct concepts of selfexecution. Part II summarizes the historical evolution of selfexecution doctrine. Part III presents a detailed analysis of the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Medellín; it demonstrates that the Court
applied a fictitious intent test in Medellín. Moreover, the Court’s
decision effectively authorized state government officers to breach
U.S. treaty obligations, even though the federal political branches
never approved such violations. Part IV presents recommendations
for the political branches and the courts. The recommendations are
designed to ensure that, in matters related to treaty implementation,
the head retains control of the members—not just in theory, but also
in practice. An Appendix at the end summarizes the many varieties of
NSE doctrines. The reader may find it helpful to refer to the
Appendix while reading the textual explanation of various
NSE doctrines.

12. I did a search in Westlaw for cases after 1999 in which the word “treaty” appears
and the word “self-executing” is used in the same sentence with either “intent” or “intention.”
The search yielded sixty-three federal court decisions and nine state court decisions. It would
require detailed analysis to determine which of those cases apply a fictitious intent test, but
there are good reasons to believe that the vast majority of the cases do so.
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I. THREE CONCEPTS OF SELF-EXECUTION
Courts and commentators agree that an NSE treaty requires
implementing legislation. 13 However, for what purpose is legislation
needed? Existing doctrine provides three different answers to that
question. Those three answers correspond to the “congressionalexecutive” concept, the “federal-state” concept, and the “politicaljudicial” concept of self-execution.
Under the political-judicial concept, self-executing (SE) treaty
provisions are judicially enforceable, but courts may not directly
apply NSE treaty provisions unless Congress enacts implementing
legislation. 14 Under this concept, unlike the congressional-executive
concept, federal executive officers are empowered to implement both
SE and NSE treaty provisions, and need not await legislative
authorization to do so. The Supreme Court applied the politicaljudicial concept in The Head Money Cases, 15 although it did not use
the term “self-executing.” There, the Court said that “the judicial
courts have nothing to do [with NSE treaties] and can give no
redress.” 16 However, SE treaties “are capable of enforcement as
between private parties in the courts of the country.” 17
The American Law Institute (ALI) is preparing a fourth
Restatement on U.S. foreign relations law. The Discussion Draft
defines self-execution in terms of the political-judicial concept. It
says: “The essential inquiry for self-execution . . . is whether a treaty
provision is directly enforceable by the courts. . . . [A]lthough it is
often noted that a non-self-executing treaty provision requires
implementing legislation[,] . . . that is not inherent in the nature of
non-self-execution.”18 The reporters’ choice to define self-execution

13. See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (noting that when treaty
“stipulations are not self-executing they can only be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry
them into effect”).
14. The doctrine does not preclude indirect application by, for example, consulting a
treaty as an aid to statutory interpretation.
15. 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
16. Id. at 598.
17. Id. at 598–99.
18. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2015). Since this Article
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in terms of judicial enforcement, instead of the need for
implementing legislation, is at odds with the weight of authority on
the subject. 19 In essence, the reporters have adopted the politicaljudicial concept as the definition of self-execution. In doing so, they
disregard a large body of evidence—summarized in this article—
showing that the courts and the political branches also apply the
congressional-executive concept and the federal-state concept. 20
Under the federal-state concept, an SE treaty automatically
supersedes conflicting state laws; no legislation is necessary to give
the treaty preemptive effect. Conversely, an NSE treaty does not
automatically supersede conflicting state laws because federal
legislation is necessary to implement the treaty. The California
Supreme Court applied the federal-state concept in Fujii v. State,
where it held that a treaty “does not automatically supersede local
laws which are inconsistent with it unless the treaty provisions are
self-executing.” 21 The Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law
also endorsed the federal-state concept. 22 Part II of this Article shows
that the federal-state concept arose after World War II in the context
of heated political debates about the “Bricker Amendment” and
judicial application of the UN Charter’s human rights provisions.
Under the congressional-executive concept, congressional
legislation is necessary to authorize federal executive action pursuant
to an NSE treaty. 23 Conversely, the President has the authority to
implement an SE treaty and need not await implementing legislation

was written, the ALI has produced a revised document on treaties entitled Preliminary Draft
No. 4. However, Preliminary Draft No. 4 says very little about self-execution doctrine, so this
Article refers primarily to the Discussion Draft.
19. Accord Carlos M. Vázquez, Four Problems with the Draft Restatement’s Treatment of
Treaty Self-Execution, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1747 (2016).
20. See infra Parts I and II.
21. 242 P.2d 617, 620 (Cal. 1952).
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 141 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (stating that an NSE treaty does not “supersede
inconsistent provisions . . . of the law of the several states”).
23. Under this concept, legislation may also be necessary to impose domestic legal
duties on federal executive officers. Power-constraining treaty provisions impose duties on the
executive branch if they are self-executing, whereas power-enhancing provisions augment
federal executive authority if they are self-executing.
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to do so. The Supreme Court applied the congressional-executive
concept in Cook v. United States, where it said: “For in a strict sense
the Treaty was self-executing, in that no legislation was necessary to
authorize executive action pursuant to its provisions.” 24 Parts I and
II demonstrate that the congressional-executive concept has been
the dominant concept of self-execution for most of U.S. history.
A. Three Concepts in Medellín
In Medellín v. Texas, Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion
applied all three concepts interchangeably, without acknowledging
the differences among them. 25 In part II of the opinion, the Court
vacillated between the federal-state concept and the political-judicial
concept. For example, Roberts said that Article 94 and Avena “do[]
not of [their] own force constitute binding federal law that preempt[] [contrary] state” law. 26 In this passage, the Court seemingly
applied the federal-state concept. Elsewhere, though, the Court
seemingly applied the political-judicial concept. For example,
Roberts wrote that “[t]he pertinent international agreements . . . do
not provide for implementation of ICJ judgments through direct
enforcement in domestic courts.” 27 This passage emphasized the
limitations on the judiciary’s power to enforce treaties, in accordance
with the political-judicial concept.
In part III of its opinion, the Court rejected the U.S.
government’s argument that the President’s memorandum required
Texas courts to grant Medellín a judicial hearing. 28 The Court said:
“A non-self-executing treaty, by definition, is one that was ratified
with the understanding that it is not to have domestic effect of its
own force.” 29 Since an NSE treaty is not domestic law, “[t]he
responsibility for transforming an international obligation arising
24. 288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933).
25. 552 U.S. 491, 497–531 (2008).
26. Id. at 522–23.
27. Id. at 513.
28. The President’s “directive” to state courts was included in a memorandum from
President Bush to the Attorney General, referred to as “the President’s memorandum.” See
id. at 503.
29. Id. at 527.
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from a non-self-executing treaty into domestic law falls to
Congress.” 30 The conclusion that congressional action is necessary
follows from “the fundamental constitutional principle that the
power to make the necessary laws is in Congress; the power to
execute in the President.” 31 In the Court’s view, the President’s
memorandum could not be justified as a valid exercise of the
President’s power to execute the law because Article 94 of the UN
Charter is not domestic law. 32 Therefore, the President’s
memorandum was an invalid attempt “to ‘enforce’ a non-selfexecuting treaty by unilaterally creating domestic law.” 33 In sum, part
III of the Court’s opinion clearly applies the congressional-executive
concept of self-execution.
The political-judicial concept cannot explain part III because,
under the political-judicial concept, an NSE treaty is law for the
executive branch. However, the core rationale in part III hinges on
the assumption that an NSE treaty is not law for the executive
branch—that is, it does not authorize the President to take action
that would be unauthorized absent the treaty. Without that
assumption, the rationale of part III simply evaporates. Granted, the
Court said in Medellín that “[t]he President may comply with the
treaty’s obligations by some other means,” but not “by unilaterally
making the treaty binding on domestic courts.” 34 That statement,
though, is merely a throw-away line. The ICJ decision required the
United States to provide a judicial hearing for Medellín. 35 Courts are
the only institutions in the United States capable of providing a
judicial hearing. Therefore, if the President could not make the ICJ
decision binding on domestic courts, he could not “comply with the
treaty’s obligations by some other means.” To put it bluntly, the only
way to comply with an obligation to provide a judicial hearing is to

30. Id. at 525–26.
31. Id. at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. See id. at 532 (stating that the President’s constitutional authority under the Take
Care Clause “allows the President to execute the laws, not make them”).
33. Id. at 527.
34. Id. at 530.
35. See Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. Rep.
12, ¶¶ 128–41, 153 (Mar. 31).
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provide a judicial hearing. The Court was surely aware of this fact
when it pronounced, rather disingenuously, that the President could
comply with the Avena judgment by some other means.
B. Three Concepts in Senate Treaty Practice
In September 2008, in an unprecedented burst of treaty activity,
the Senate consented to seventy-eight treaties in four days. 36 The
Senate’s unusual flurry of activity was in response to the Court’s
March 2008 decision in Medellín. Senate treaty actions in September
2008 provide the best evidence of the treatymakers’ understanding
of the terms “self-executing” and “non-self-executing.”
For seven of the seventy-eight treaties, the Senate adopted
declarations specifying that the treaty is “not self-executing.” 37 For
sixty-nine other treaties, it adopted declarations specifying that the
treaty is either wholly or partially self-executing. 38 The Senate did not
specifically define the term “self-executing” or “non-self-executing.”
36. See 154 CONG. REC. 20,166–74 (2008); 154 CONG. REC. 21,775–78 (2008); 154
CONG. REC. 22,464–65 (2008).
37. See 1992 Partial Revision of the Radio Regulations (Geneva 1979), Mar. 3, 1992,
S. TREATY DOC. NO. 107-17 (2002) (resolution of ratification at 154 CONG. REC. 20,170–71
(2008)); 1995 Revision of the Radio Regulations, Nov. 17, 1995, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 10828 (2004) (resolution of ratification at 154 CONG. REC. 20,171 (2008)); Land-Based Sources
Protocol to the Cartagena Convention, Oct. 6, 1999, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 110-1 (2007)
(resolution of ratification at 154 CONG. REC. 21,776 (2008)); 1998 Amendments to the
Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) (Geneva
1992), Nov. 6, 1998, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-5 (2003) (resolution of ratification at 154
CONG. REC. 21,778 (2008)); 2002 Amendments to the Constitution and Convention of the
International Telecommunication Union (Geneva, 1992), Oct. 18, 2002, S. TREATY DOC.
NO. 109-11 (2006) (resolution of ratification at 154 CONG. REC. 21,778 (2008)); 2006
Amendments to the Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication
Union (Geneva, 1992), Nov. 24, 2006, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 110-16 (2008) (resolution of
ratification at 154 CONG. REC. 21,778 (2008)); International Convention on the Control of
Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems on Ships, 2001, Dec. 12, 2002, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 110-13
(2008) (resolution of ratification at 154 CONG. REC. 22,465 (2008)).
38. See 154 CONG. REC. 20,166–74 (2008). The two treaties for which the Senate did
not adopt either an SE declaration or an NSE declaration were: Protocol to the North Atlantic
Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of the Republic of Albania, July 9, 2008, S. TREATY DOC.
NO. 110-20 (2008) (resolution of ratification at 154 CONG. REC. 21,777 (2008)); and
Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of the Republic of Croatia,
July 9, 2008, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 110-20 (2008) (resolution of ratification at 154 CONG.
REC. 21,777 (2008)).
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However, Senate resolutions for eight treaties (the “eight key
treaties”) shed light on its apparent understanding of those terms.
For three of the eight treaties, the Senate adopted declarations
substantially equivalent to the following: “This Protocol is selfexecuting. This Protocol does not confer private rights enforceable in
United States courts.” 39 For the other five treaties, the Senate
declarations specified that the treaty was partially SE and partially
NSE. Those declarations included language substantially equivalent
to the following: “None of the provisions in the Convention . . . confer
private rights enforceable in United States courts.” 40
The Senate clearly did not conceive of self-execution in terms of
the federal-state concept because all of the eight key treaties address
matters governed by federal law, not state law. 41 Moreover, the
Senate did not conceive of self-execution in terms of the politicaljudicial concept. For the eight key treaties, it declared in a single
paragraph that the treaty was wholly or partially self-executing and
that it was not “enforceable in United States courts.” If the Senate
understood self-execution in terms of the political-judicial concept,
those two statements would be mutually contradictory because,
under the political-judicial concept, “self-executing” means

39. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, Apr. 8,
1982, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-1(B) (1997) (resolution of ratification at 154 CONG. REC.
20,171 (2008)) (emphasis added); see also Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, Apr. 8, 1982,
S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-1(C) (1997) (resolution of ratification at 154 CONG. REC. 20,171
(2008)); Amendment to Article 1 of Convention on Conventional Weapons, Dec. 8, 2005, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 109-10(B) (2006) (resolution of ratification at 154 CONG. REC. 20,171
(2008)). The declarations cited in this and the next footnote exemplify the no private
enforcement doctrine. See APPENDIX.
40. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Sept.
14, 2005, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 110-4 (2007) (resolution of ratification at 154 CONG. REC.
21,776–77 (2008)) (emphasis added); see also Hague Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 1061(A) (1999) (resolution of ratification at 154 CONG. REC. 21,776 (2008)); Amendment to
the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, July 8, 2005, S. TREATY DOC.
NO. 110-6 (2007) (resolution of ratification at 154 CONG. REC. 21,776 (2008)); 2005 Fixed
Platforms Protocol, Feb. 17, 2006, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 110-8 (2007) (resolution of
ratification at 154 CONG. REC. 21,777 (2008)); Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War, Dec.
8, 2005, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 109-10(C) (2006) (resolution of ratification at 154 CONG.
REC. 22,464–65 (2008)).
41. See supra notes 39–40.
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“enforceable in courts.” In contrast, there is no contradiction under
the congressional-executive concept because “self-executing” means
that legislation is not needed to authorize federal executive action
pursuant to the treaty. Therefore, the declarations for the eight key
treaties make it abundantly clear that the Senate understood selfexecution in terms of the congressional-executive concept, not the
political-judicial concept. 42
The ALI Discussion Draft cites the Secretary of State’s report on
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities as
evidence that the political branches understand self-execution in
terms of the political-judicial concept. 43 On closer examination,
though, the Senate record for the Disabilities Convention
demonstrates persuasively that the political branches do not
understand NSE declarations in terms of the political-judicial
concept. The Senate Committee Report for the Disabilities
Convention explains the NSE declaration as follows: “This
[declaration] reflects the shared understanding of the committee and
the executive branch that the provisions of the Treaty are not selfexecuting, are not directly enforceable in U.S. courts, and do not
confer private rights of action enforceable in the United States.” 44 If
the political branches understood self-execution in terms of the
political-judicial concept, the statements that the treaty provisions
42. The ALI Discussion Draft claims that one of the eight key declarations—the one
attached to the Hague Convention on Cultural Property—shows only that the Senate rejected
the “private right of action” version of SE doctrine. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: TREATIES § 106 n.4 (AM. LAW INST.,
Discussion Draft 2015). With due respect for the Reporters, that claim is implausible. None of
the eight declarations uses the term “private right of action.” All eight declarations say that the
treaties are not “enforceable in United States courts.” See supra notes 39–40 and
accompanying text. The statement that the treaties are not enforceable in courts, combined
with the statement that the treaties are partially or wholly self-executing, demonstrates clearly
that the Senate understood self-execution in terms of the congressional-executive concept, not
the political-judicial concept.
43. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 reporter’s note 4 (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2015) (citing and
quoting COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 112-6, at 6 (2012)).
44. S. EXEC. REP. NO. 112-6, at 14; see also COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 113-12, at
23 (2014) (repeating the identical language).
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“are not self-executing” and “not directly enforceable in U.S.
courts” would be entirely redundant. In contrast, the redundancy is
eliminated if one construes “not self-executing” to mean “not
supreme law of the land,” as in the federal-state concept. 45 Under the
federal-state concept, the statements that the treaty provisions are
“not directly enforceable” and “do not confer private rights of
action” are not redundant because they both follow as a logical
consequence from the statement that the provisions are “not selfexecuting” (i.e., not supreme law of the land).
It is important, here, to highlight a key difference between the
Disabilities Convention and the eight treaties that combine SE
declarations with “not enforceable in courts.” Whereas those eight
treaties address matters governed exclusively by federal law, the
Disabilities Convention also addresses matters governed by state law.
Hence, the political branches wanted to clarify that the Disabilities
Convention will not operate as a rule of conduct for federal
executive officers (per the congressional-executive concept) and that
it will not supersede conflicting state laws (per the federal-state
concept). If the NSE declaration attached to the Disabilities
Convention is construed in accordance with the federal-state
concept, it expresses both ideas simultaneously. Since an NSE treaty
is not the “supreme law of the land” under the federal-state concept,
it necessarily follows that it does not operate as a rule of conduct for
federal executive officers.
In sum, analysis of recent Senate treaty actions demonstrates
clearly that the Senate does not understand self-execution in terms of
the political-judicial concept. Thus, the ALI’s attempt to define selfexecution in terms of the political-judicial concept is at odds with the
Senate’s understanding and with part III of the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Medellín.

45. Here, I assume that the statement that a treaty “does not supersede conflicting state
laws” is equivalent to a statement that a treaty is not “the supreme law of the land.”

1702

8.SLOSS.AA (DO NOT DELETE)

1691

5/3/2016 11:26 AM

Taming Madison’s Monster

II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SELF-EXECUTION DOCTRINE
The standard account of self-execution identifies Chief Justice
Marshall’s 1829 opinion in Foster v. Neilson46 as the source of
modern doctrine. That account is mistaken in several respects. First,
judges cite Foster as authority for the “one-step approach” to SE
analysis, but Marshall applied a “two-step approach” in Foster.47
Professor Edwin Dickinson invented the one-step approach in a law
review article published in 1926. 48 Second, judges cite Foster as
authority for the federal-state concept of self-execution, but Foster
did not implicate state law. The federal-state concept emerged in the
1950s in response to the advent of modern international human
rights law. 49 Third, the misguided focus on Foster creates the false
impression that courts developed self-execution doctrine. In fact,
courts said very little about self-execution before World War I;
legislative and executive materials were the primary sources of
authority until the 1920s. Part II presents a brief history of SE
doctrine. This account distinguishes between the “main channel” of
historical development and two “side channels.” 50
A. The Main Channel of Doctrinal Evolution
Phase One: The main body of SE doctrine developed in four
phases. In phase one, self-execution was a constitutional doctrine
that corresponded with the congressional-executive concept (the
constitutional doctrine). 51 The SE/NSE dichotomy distinguished
between: (1) treaties that the President has constitutional authority
to implement, without awaiting congressional authorization (self46. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
47. See David L. Sloss, Executing Foster v. Neilson: The Two-Step-Approach to Analyzing
Self-Executing Treaties, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 135 (2012); see also infra notes 77–82 and
accompanying text (explaining the “one-step” and “two-step” approaches).
48. Edwin D. Dickinson, Are the Liquor Treaties Self-Executing?, 20 AM. J.
INT’L L. 444 (1926).
49. See infra notes 90–105 and accompanying text.
50. The account presented here relies heavily on David L. Sloss, The Death of Treaty
Supremacy: An Invisible Constitutional Change (2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (providing detailed documentation to support claims made in Part II).
51. See APPENDIX.
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executing); and (2) treaties that the President lacks authority to
implement until Congress enacts implementing legislation (non-selfexecuting). 52 Congress discussed self-execution extensively in debates
related to the following treaties: implementation of the Jay Treaty in
1795-96, 53 an 1815 commercial treaty with Great Britain, 54 the 1867
treaty acquiring Alaska from Russia, 55 and an 1884 commercial treaty
with Hawaii. 56 Legislators never agreed fully about which treaties
were SE and which ones were NSE. However, they did agree that
the SE/NSE distinction was a federal separation-of-powers concept
rooted in U.S. constitutional law, not a treaty interpretation doctrine
rooted in international law. In the nineteenth century, legislative
materials on self-execution were far more voluminous than judicial
decisions on the topic. 57
Phase Two: In phase two, the focus shifted from Congress to the
executive branch. In nineteenth century congressional debates, the
most contentious constitutional issue involved treaties reducing
import duties. 58 Members of the House of Representatives routinely
insisted that such treaties were constitutionally NSE. 59 To sidestep
the constitutional issue, the executive branch began to insert
“condition precedent clauses” in treaties. 60 Those clauses specified
that the treaty would not enter into force internationally until after
Congress enacted implementing legislation. The first such treaty was

52. See Sloss, supra note 50.
53. See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 426–783 (1796); John T. Parry, Congress, the Supremacy
Clause, and the Implementation of Treaties, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1209, 1276–94 (2009).
54. See 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 46–54, 419–595, 1019–22 (1816); Parry, supra
note 53, at 1303–16.
55. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 4052–55 (1868); Act of July 27, 1868,
ch. 247, 15 Stat. 198 (appropriating money to carry into effect Treaty with Russia, U.S-Rus.,
Mar. 30, 1857, 15 Stat. 539); SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND
ENFORCEMENT 135–47 (John Byrne & Co. ed., 1904).
56. See Treaty with the Hawaiian Islands, Jan. 30, 1875, H.R. REP. NO. 49-4177
(1887); Jean Galbraith, Congress’s Treaty-Implementing Power in Historical Practice, 56 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 59, 89–93 (2014).
57. See Sloss, supra note 50.
58. See id.
59. See, e.g., Treaty with the Hawaiian Islands, H.R. REP. NO. 49-4177; CRANDALL,
supra note 55, at 135–47.
60. See APPENDIX (noting “condition precedent doctrine”).
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signed in 1854. 61 Article V specified: “The present treaty shall take
effect as soon as the laws required to carry it into operation shall have
been passed by the Imperial Parliament of Great Britain . . . on the
one hand, and by the Congress of the United States on the other.”62
In the late nineteenth century, the executive branch routinely
added condition-precedent clauses to treaties affecting import
duties. 63 By inserting condition precedent clauses, the executive
branch effectively bypassed legislative debates about whether the
treaty was constitutionally NSE. Since the treaty did not enter into
force internationally until after Congress enacted implementing
legislation, the self-execution issue became irrelevant. Conditionprecedent clauses can be viewed as the nineteenth-century
predecessor of modern NSE declarations, but they differ from NSE
declarations in certain respects. Condition-precedent clauses
required legislation as a precondition for the treaty to take effect
internationally. In contrast, modern NSE declarations do not affect
international entry into force. Instead, modern NSE declarations
require legislation as a precondition for the treaty to “take effect”
domestically. 64 (Leave aside, for now, the question of precisely what it
means for a treaty to “take effect” domestically.) By adopting
condition-precedent clauses, the nineteenth-century treatymakers
(i.e., the President and Senate, acting together under the Article II
Treaty Power) applied their power over international law to establish
preconditions for the treaty to take effect internationally. In contrast,
by adopting NSE declarations, modern treatymakers apply their power
over domestic law to establish preconditions for the treaty to take effect
domestically, even after it has entered into force internationally. 65

61. Fisheries, Commerce, and Navigation in North America, U.S.-U.K., June 5, 1854,
10 Stat. 1089.
62. Id. at 1092.
63. See, e.g., Treaty of Washington, U.S.-U.K., May 8, 1871, 17 Stat. 863; Convention
on Commercial Reciprocity, U.S.-Haw., Jan. 30, 1875, 19 Stat. 625; Convention on
Commerce, U.S.-Mex., Jan. 20, 1883, 24 Stat. 975; Convention on Commercial Relations,
U.S.-Cuba, Dec. 11, 1902, 33 Stat. 2136.
64. See David L. Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-SelfExecuting Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 129 (1999).
65. It is generally agreed that the effect of NSE declarations is purely domestic.
Scholars disagree about whether Article II grants the treatymakers the power to regulate
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Phase Three: Phase three began in 1926 when Edwin Dickinson
published an article entitled Are the Liquor Treaties Self-Executing? 66
The “liquor treaties” in the article’s title were a set of bilateral
treaties with sixteen countries to help enforce Prohibition Era laws
banning liquor imports. 67 Before the treaties were concluded, federal
statutes imposed a twelve-mile limit on the Coast Guard’s searchand-seizure operations at sea. 68 So-called “rum runners” evaded
enforcement of federal liquor laws by stationing large vessels with
contraband beyond the twelve-mile limit and using small, fast boats
to ferry liquor from the large, hovering vessels to the coast. The
treaties expanded the geographic reach of the executive’s search-andseizure authority beyond the twelve-mile limit. However, when
federal authorities seized vessels and filed civil forfeiture claims or
criminal charges against the rum runners, several lower courts
dismissed the charges on the grounds that the liquor treaties were
not self-executing. 69 Dickinson sought to demonstrate that the
treaties were self-executing—meaning that the treaties themselves
authorized federal executive action that was prohibited under
prior statutes.
From Dickinson’s standpoint, it was not sufficient to show that
the treaties authorized search-and-seizure beyond the twelve-mile
limit (which they clearly did). 70 He also wanted to show that the
treaties extended the geographic reach of U.S. criminal laws. If the
treaties did not have that effect, he said, they would merely authorize
domestic law in a way that is not contingent upon the international obligation in the treaty. See
sources cited infra notes 131-32. Here, I assume that Article II does grant the treatymakers a
limited power of that type.
66. Dickinson, supra note 48.
67. See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 109 n.2 (1933) (citing treaties).
68. See Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356 § 581, 42 Stat. 858, 979 (1922). The United States
had similar statutes since 1790 that authorized enforcement of federal laws beyond U.S.
territorial waters. See Edwin D. Dickinson, Jurisdiction at the Maritime Frontier, 40 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 12–18 (1926).
69. Dickinson specifically cited The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838 (D. Conn. 1925), United
States v. The Sagatind, 8 F.2d 788 (S.D.N.Y. 1925), and United States v. The Sagatind, 11 F.2d
673 (2d Cir. 1926) as examples of lower court cases holding that the liquor treaties were
not self-executing.
70. See, e.g., Convention for Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors, U.S.-Gr.
Brit., art. II, Jan. 23, 1924, 43 Stat. 1761.
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the executive “to search and seize foreign vessels which are guilty of
no offense.” 71 In this respect, Dickinson was mistaken. As the
Supreme Court explained in Ford v. United States—decided in 1927,
one year after Dickinson published his article—“[t]he issue whether
the ship was seized within the prescribed limit did not affect the
question of the defendants’ guilt or innocence.” 72 In other words,
the vessels hovering beyond the twelve-mile limit were guilty of
violating U.S. liquor laws even before the treaties were adopted. The
problem, absent the treaties, was that personnel on those vessels had
a valid defense to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts if seizure occurred
beyond the twelve-mile limit. The treaties removed that jurisdictional
defense by authorizing seizures beyond the twelve-mile statutory limit. 73
However, Dickinson wrote his article before the Court decided
Ford, and he proceeded on the mistaken premise that the treaties
must expand the geographic reach of federal criminal law to
accomplish their intended goals. Here, he confronted a problem.
Leading authorities suggested that a treaty creating new criminal
penalties was constitutionally NSE, meaning that Congress must
enact implementing legislation before the executive is authorized to
prosecute offenders. 74 If a treaty creating new criminal penalties was
constitutionally NSE, then one might infer that a treaty expanding
the geographic reach of federal criminal laws was also constitutionally
NSE. At least one lower court had so held. 75 However, Dickinson
resisted that conclusion. 76 So, he argued, the classification of liquor
treaties as SE or NSE should be based on a treaty interpretation
analysis, not a separation-of-powers analysis. 77 By shifting the focus
of the inquiry from a constitutional separation-of-powers analysis to

71. Dickinson, supra note 48, at 452.
72. 273 U.S. 593, 606 (1927).
73. See id. at 604–06.
74. See QUINCY W RIGHT, THE C ONTROL OF AMERICAN F OREIGN R ELATIONS
355–56 (1922).
75. The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838 (D. Conn. 1925).
76. See Dickinson, supra note 48, at 449–50.
77. See id. at 448–49.
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a treaty interpretation analysis, Dickinson invented the “one-step”
approach to SE doctrine and the associated intent doctrine. 78
Here, it is crucial to appreciate the distinction between the “onestep” and “two-step” approaches. Under the two-step approach,
courts perform a treaty interpretation analysis to ascertain the
content and scope of the international obligation codified in the
treaty (step one). Then, in step two, they perform a domestic
separation-of-powers analysis to determine whether legislation is
needed to authorize federal executive officers to implement that
international obligation. 79 Under the two-step approach, step two
necessarily follows step one because the separation-of-powers analysis
is contingent upon the treaty interpretation analysis. In contrast,
when courts apply the one-step approach, they combine both steps
into a single step by performing a treaty interpretation analysis to
answer a domestic separation-of-powers question. In his influential
law review article, Dickinson urged courts to perform a treaty
interpretation analysis to answer a domestic separation-of-powers
question—specifically, the question whether new federal legislation
was needed to authorize prosecution of individuals seized beyond
the twelve-mile limit. 80
The preceding paragraph explains the distinction between the
one-step and two-step approaches from the judicial perspective. One
can also view the distinction from the perspective of the
treatymakers. Under the two-step approach, the treatymakers use
their Article II power to make decisions about the content of the
international obligation. Certain domestic consequences follow from
those decisions, but the domestic consequences are contingent upon
the international obligation. Thus, the treatymakers shape domestic
law indirectly by and through the international obligation. Under
the one-step approach, though, the treatymakers use their Article II
power to make decisions about domestic law—specifically, about the
allocation of treaty-implementing authority between Congress and
the President. Moreover, their decisions about domestic separation-

78. See APPENDIX.
79. See Sloss, supra note 47.
80. See Dickinson, supra note 48 at 447–50.
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of-powers issues are not contingent upon the content of the
international obligation. Thus, the one-step approach assumes that the
treatymakers can use their Article II power to shape domestic law directly.
Dickinson defended the one-step approach by citing Marshall’s
opinion in Foster v. Neilson as authority. 81 He claimed that Marshall
performed a treaty interpretation analysis in Foster to distinguish
between SE and NSE treaties. As I have explained in detail
elsewhere, Dickinson’s interpretation of Foster was mistaken, because
Marshall applied a two-step approach in Foster. 82 Nevertheless,
Dickinson’s one-step approach—sometimes called the “intent
doctrine” because it focuses on the intent of the treatymakers—soon
gained widespread acceptance. A comparison of the treatment of
self-execution in Moore’s Digest and Hackworth’s Digest provides
evidence of Dickinson’s influence. (The two digests provide the best
evidence of official State Department views at the time they were
published.) Moore’s Digest, published in 1906, said very little about
self-execution because there were few relevant judicial decisions at
that time. In his brief references to self-execution, Moore said
nothing about the “intent of the treatymakers,” nor did he endorse a
one-step approach to SE analysis. 83 In contrast, Hackworth’s Digest,
published between 1940 and 1944, includes a much more detailed
treatment of self-execution issues. Moreover, Hackworth
enthusiastically endorsed Dickinson’s intent doctrine, in which
courts apply a treaty interpretation analysis to answer a domestic
separation-of-powers question. 84
Hackworth probably endorsed the one-step approach because it
supported the rise of executive discretion in foreign affairs. Professor
White has documented the fact that, in the period between the two
world wars, several distinct doctrinal developments contributed to a

81. See id.
82. See Sloss, supra note 47, at 143–64; see also infra notes 108–123 and
accompanying text.
83. See 5 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, §§ 750, 758,
765, 776–77 (1906).
84. See Self-Executing Treaties, 5 GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. XVI, § 488; see also Sloss, supra note 50 (presenting a detailed
comparison of Moore’s and Hackworth’s Digests).

1709

8.SLOSS.AA (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/3/2016 11:26 AM

2015

transfer of constitutional foreign affairs powers from Congress to the
executive. 85 Dickinson’s one-step approach was one such development.
His approach assumed that the President has discretion, in his treatymaking capacity, to alter otherwise applicable separation-of-powers
principles by drafting treaty language that vests treaty-implementing
authority in the executive branch, rather than Congress. 86
The shift from a two-step to a one-step approach raises two
distinct issues. First, from a constitutional standpoint, does Article II
grant the treatymakers the power to shape domestic law directly, in a
way that is not contingent upon the content of the international
obligation? For the purpose of this Article, I assume that the answer
is “yes.” 87 Second, and of more immediate interest here, the one-step
approach induces courts to decide cases by reference to a fictitious
“intent of the treatymakers.” Let us assume that Article II does grant
the treatymakers the power to make decisions about domestic
separation-of-powers issues that are not contingent upon the content
of the international obligation. Even so, the fact remains that the
treatymakers rarely exercise that power. 88 Thus, if a court asks how a
particular treaty allocates treaty-implementing responsibility between
Congress and the President, the correct answer in most cases is that
the treaty does not address that question. Nevertheless, the accepted
doctrine under the one-step approach directs courts to apply a treaty
interpretation analysis to decide whether legislation is needed to

85. See G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign
Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1 (1999).
86. See Sloss, supra note 50 (explaining in greater detail the relationship between the
one-step approach and the rise of executive discretion in foreign affairs).
87. Professor Vázquez provides an insightful analysis of this question, although he
frames the question in slightly different terms. See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of
the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV.
599, 667–85 (2008).
88. A list that the Justice Department provided to Congress in 2012 identified twentythree treaties approved by the Senate between 1990 and 2011 that included NSE declarations.
See Supplemental List Provided by Eve Hill in Answer to a Question from Senator James Risch
During Her Testimony, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 112-6, at 121–24. One is hard pressed to identify
more than a handful of other treaties—aside from those identified in the Justice Department’s
list—where the treatymakers exercised the power at issue.
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authorize executive action to implement the treaty. 89 Since the treaty
does not answer that question (in most cases), courts fabricate a
fictitious “intent of the treatymakers.”
In sum, Dickinson’s article had tremendous influence over the
subsequent development of SE doctrine because he initiated the shift
from a two-step to a one-step approach. Under the one-step
approach, courts apply a treaty interpretation analysis to answer a
domestic separation-of-powers question. Since most treaties do not
answer that question, courts create a fictitious “intent of the
treatymakers.” Over the past few decades, application of the fictitious
intent test has become the dominant approach to judicial analysis of
self-execution issues.
Phase Four: In phase four, lawyers and judges expanded the
concept of self-execution to encompass the previously distinct
doctrine of treaty supremacy. 90 From the Founding until World War
II, treaty supremacy doctrine and self-execution doctrine were
independent, non-overlapping doctrines. Treaty supremacy
addressed the relationship between treaties and state law. The treaty
supremacy rule consisted of two elements: first, treaties supersede
conflicting state laws; second, courts have a constitutional duty to
apply treaties that conflict with state laws. Before World War II, selfexecution doctrine operated purely on a federal separation-of-powers
level. It addressed the division of authority over treaty
implementation between Congress and the President. Indeed,
Quincy Wright wrote in 1951: “the distinction between selfexecuting and non-self-executing treaties has been used in American
constitutional law only with reference to the agency of the Federal
Government competent to execute the treaty and has had no
reference to the relations between the Federal Government and . . .
the States.” 91 Thus, before World War II, treaty supremacy doctrine
applied to treaties that intersected with areas of state regulatory
89.

See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505, 514 (2008); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
§ 111(4) (AM. LAW INST. 1986).
90. In a forthcoming book, I provide extensive documentation to support the main
points summarized in this paragraph. See Sloss, supra note 50.
91. Quincy Wright, National Courts and Human Rights–The Fujii Case, 45 AM. J.
INT’L L. 62, 64 (1951).

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
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authority and self-execution doctrine applied to treaties that
intersected with areas of federal regulatory authority. There was no
NSE exception to the treaty supremacy rule because the concept of
self-execution did not apply to treaty supremacy cases—that is, cases
involving an alleged conflict between a treaty and state law.
This picture changed dramatically after World War II. Adoption
of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
unleashed a flood of litigation in U.S. courts between 1948 and
1954 in which plaintiffs invoked the Charter’s human rights
provisions in conjunction with the treaty supremacy rule to challenge
state and local laws that discriminated on the basis of race or
nationality. 92 Consistent with the traditional approach—which placed
treaty supremacy and self-execution in separate “baskets”—courts
initially decided those cases without reference to self-execution
doctrine. In the celebrated Fujii case, an intermediate appellate court
in California ruled that California’s Alien Land Law was invalid
because it conflicted with the UN Charter’s human rights
provisions. 93 In short, the lower court decided Fujii as a treaty
supremacy case, not a self-execution case.
The Fujii decision sparked a huge political firestorm, which in
turn generated support for a proposed constitutional amendment,
known as the Bricker Amendment. 94 One key goal of the Bricker
Amendment was to abolish the treaty supremacy rule. 95 Opponents
of the Bricker Amendment argued that a constitutional amendment
was unnecessary because Article II granted the treatymakers the
power to opt out of the treaty supremacy rule on a case-by-case
basis. Attorney General Brownell, Secretary of State Dulles, and
Harold Stassen (Director of the Mutual Security Administration) all
presented variants of this argument in their official Senate testimony

92. See Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., The United Nations Charter and United States Civil
Rights Litigation: 1946–1955, 69 IOWA L. REV. 901 (1984).
93. Fujii v. California, 217 P.2d 481 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950).
94. On the political linkage between Fujii and the Bricker Amendment, see Judith
Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple
Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1598–1606 (2006).
95. See generally DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A
TEST OF EISENHOWER’S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (1988).
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on the Bricker Amendment. 96 The New York City Bar Association
made a similar argument. 97 The minority view in the Senate Judiciary
Committee report advanced this argument. 98 Senator George
presented the argument during floor debate. 99 President Eisenhower
himself made a similar argument in a private letter to John
McCloy. 100 They all articulated a similar message: “A constitutional
amendment is unnecessary, because the treatymakers have the power
to decide that a treaty shall not supersede conflicting state laws, and
they can exercise that power by specifying—either in the treaty itself,
or in a unilateral reservation—that the treaty is not self-executing.”
Thus was born the “NSE exception to the treaty supremacy rule,” or
the “optional treaty supremacy rule,” which I also call the Fujii
doctrine. 101 The claim that the treaty supremacy rule is optional
played a key role in defeating the Bricker Amendment.
Here, it is important to understand the conceptual shift that
created the optional treaty supremacy rule. First, in the period
between about 1926 and 1943, the one-step approach to selfexecution became the accepted doctrine. 102 Under the one-step
approach, Article II grants the treatymakers the power to decide
whether a treaty is SE or NSE, and they can exercise that power in a
manner that is not contingent upon the content of the international
obligation. Then, between about 1949 and 1954, lawyers expanded
the concept of self-execution beyond the congressional-executive
concept to encompass the federal-state concept. By combining the
one-step approach with the federal-state concept, the NSE exception

96. Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 83d Cong. 921–22 (1953) (statement of Att’y Gen. Herbert
Brownell); id. at 835 (memorandum submitted by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles); id.
at 1059 (statement of Harold Stassen).
97. Id. at 244–46 (report submitted by New York City Bar Association).
98. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT RELATIVE TO
TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, S. REP. NO. 412, at 41–42 (1953) (minority views).
99. 100 CONG. REC. 2,200, 2,204 (1954) (statements of Sen. George).
100. Letter from President Eisenhower to John J. McCloy (Jan. 13, 1954), in FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1952–1954, at 1833–34 (William Z. Slany et al. eds., 1983).
101. See APPENDIX.
102. 1943 was the year the State Department published the treaty volume of
Hackworth’s Digest.
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to the treaty supremacy rule was born. After 1954, a new
constitutional understanding established that Article II grants the
treatymakers the power to decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether a
treaty supersedes conflicting state laws. According to this new
constitutional understanding: (1) the treatymakers decide in the
context of treaty negotiation and ratification whether the treaty is SE
or NSE (the one-step approach); and (2) an NSE treaty does not
supersede conflicting state laws (the federal-state concept). The
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law, published in 1965,
endorsed the NSE exception to the treaty supremacy rule. 103 So, too,
did Whiteman’s Digest of International Law, published in 1970,104
and Professor Henkin’s leading treatise on U.S. foreign relations law,
published in 1972. 105
The new constitutional understanding that emerged from the
Bricker Amendment controversy awakened the ghost of Madison’s
monster. Since the one-step approach induces courts to decide cases
by reference to a fictitious “intent of the treatymakers,” and since the
classification of a treaty as “non-self-executing” now means that the
treaty does not supersede conflicting state laws, the result is that
courts apply a fictitious intent test to determine whether it is
permissible for state and local government officers to breach U.S.
treaty obligations. Indeed, that is precisely what the Supreme Court
did in Medellín. Before addressing Medellín, though, we must
address the “side channels” of self-execution doctrine that developed
in parallel with the main channel.

103. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 141 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
104. See Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 14 DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. XLII, § 29, at 302 (Marjorie M. Whiteman ed., 1970). The
Department of State published a fifteen-volume Digest of International Law between 1963 and
1973, edited by Marjorie M. Whiteman, which includes a volume on treaties published in
1970. Section 29 specifies that treaties are self-executing “when their terms clearly convey such
an intention.” Id. Moreover, it says that the SE/NSE distinction “determines the procedures
whereby treaties become the law of the land.” Id. Only self-executing treaties “take effect” as
the law of the land “without legislative implementation.” Id. NSE treaties, by themselves are
not “supreme” “as against state statutes.” Id.
105. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 157 (1972).
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B. Two Side Channels
The canonical view of SE doctrine traces the origins of the
doctrine to Chief Justice Marshall’s 1829 opinion in Foster v.
Neilson. 106 In contrast, the historical account presented here suggests
that Foster did not become an important source of authority for SE
doctrine until Edwin Dickinson published his transformative article
almost one hundred years later. The ALI’s recent Discussion Draft
defines self-execution in terms of the political-judicial concept. 107 In
contrast, the preceding historical account largely ignored the
political-judicial concept. This Section first addresses Foster and then
turns to the political-judicial concept of self-execution.
1. Foster v. Neilson
I have written extensively about Foster elsewhere. To avoid
repetition, I make a few brief points here and refer readers to other
sources for supporting details. 108 First, Foster provides no support for
an NSE exception to the treaty supremacy rule because there was no
state law at issue in Foster. Foster involved a dispute over title to real
property. The plaintiffs’ claim was based on a Spanish land grant,
which they alleged was protected by Article 8 of the 1819 treaty
between the United States and Spain (the “Florida Treaty”). 109 The
published decision in Foster does not specify the legal basis of
defendant’s claim. However, we know from other sources that
defendant’s asserted property right was based on federal law, not
state law. Daniel Webster represented the plaintiffs in Foster.
Webster’s papers specify that the defendant, David Neilson, was “the
occupant under a United States grant.” 110 Additionally, in his oral
106. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
107. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2015).
108. See Sloss, supra note 50; Sloss, supra note 47, at 143–64; David L. Sloss, When Do
Treaties Create Individually Enforceable Rights?: The Supreme Court Ducks the Issue in Hamdan
and Sanchez-Llamas, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 20, 78–90 (2006).
109. See Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 253–55, 300–03.
110. 3 THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER, ser. 2, pt. II, at 961 (Andrew J. King ed.,
1989) [hereinafter WEBSTER PAPERS].
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argument, Webster conceded that if the Court rejected the validity of
plaintiffs’ Spanish land grant, then the land “belonged to the United
States or her grantees.” 111 David Neilson was one of those grantees.
As the recipient of a grant from the federal government, Neilson’s
property claim was based on federal law, not state law.
Second, Marshall’s treaty interpretation analysis in Foster focused
on the nineteenth-century distinction between executory and
executed treaties, not the modern distinction between SE and NSE
treaties. The SE/NSE distinction involves a “who” question: is
treaty implementation the responsibility of Congress, the President,
or the courts? The executed/executory distinction involves a
“when” question: does the treaty accomplish its goal immediately
upon entry into force or is future action necessary to implement the
treaty? Article 8 of the Florida Treaty specified that land grants by
Spanish authorities “shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in
possession of the lands.” 112 In Foster, Marshall distinguished this
language from hypothetical language stating that land “grants are
hereby confirmed.” 113 “Had such been its language,” said Marshall,
“it would have acted directly on the subject.” 114 In other words, it
would have been executed, not executory, because no future action
would be necessary to implement a provision stating that grants “are
hereby confirmed.” However, according to Marshall’s analysis, since
Article 8 specified that the land grants “shall be ratified and
confirmed,” the treaty merely “pledge[d] the faith of the United
States to pass acts which shall ratify and confirm” the grants. 115 In
other words, he concluded that Article 8 was executory, because it
obligated the United States to take future action to confirm the
grants. Richard Smith Coxe, Daniel Webster’s co-counsel, said
shortly after the Foster decision that the Court construed “the treaty
of 1819 as an executory contract between the two nations, which did

111. Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 293 (argument of counsel).
112. Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, U.S.-Spain, art. VIII, Feb. 22, 1819,
18 Stat. 252.
113. Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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not of itself confirm the existing titles, but merely stipulated that
they should be confirmed.” 116
The Court decided United States v. Percheman 117 four years after
Foster. Joseph White, the attorney who represented Percheman,
compared the English and Spanish versions of Article 8 of the
Florida Treaty. He argued that “[t]he English side of the treaty
leaves the ratification of the grants executory—they shall be ratified;
the Spanish, executed—they shall continue acknowledged and
confirmed.” 118 Marshall’s analysis of the Spanish and English texts
closely tracked White’s argument in Percheman. 119 Marshall
contrasted the Spanish version—which (as newly retranslated)
specified that grants “shall remain ratified and confirmed”—with the
original English version, which specified that grants “shall be ratified
and confirmed.” 120 He concluded that Article 8 was executed, as it
applied to Percheman’s land, because the United States did not need
to take any future action to perfect Percheman’s already-perfect
title. 121 Although Marshall did not use the words “executed” and
“executory,” later nineteenth-century Supreme Court opinions
confirm that Marshall’s analysis in Foster and Percheman focused on
the distinction between executory and executed treaty provisions. 122
Finally, Marshall applied a two-step approach in Foster, not a
one-step approach. Marshall’s conclusion that Article 8 of the
Florida treaty was NSE was not based solely on a treaty interpretation
analysis. His treaty interpretation analysis focused on an international
law question: whether Article 8 was executory or executed. His
conclusion that Article 8 was NSE involved a second step: a domestic
separation-of-powers analysis to determine whether the treaty
required legislative implementation. 123 Granted, step two of the two116. WEBSTER PAPERS, supra note 110, at 994 (emphasis added).
117. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833).
118. Id. at 69 (emphasis added).
119. Compare id. at 88–89 (Marshall’s opinion), with id. at 68–70 (White’s argument).
120. Id. at 88–89.
121. Id. at 86–89.
122. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 746 (1838) (stating
that Foster “recognized the distinction between an executory treaty . . . and an
executed treaty”).
123. For detailed analysis of the second step in Foster, see Sloss, supra note 47, at 159–62.
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step analysis in Foster was implicit, not explicit. Thus, the two-step
interpretation of Foster is problematic in that it assumes that Marshall
failed to explain a critical step in his analysis. However, the one-step
interpretation is even more problematic, because it assumes that
Marshall made a fundamental category mistake by applying a treaty
interpretation analysis to answer a domestic separation-of-powers
question that the treaty did not address. I prefer to think that
Marshall’s SE analysis in Foster was merely incomplete, rather than
accusing Marshall of failing to understand the difference between an
international law question (the “when” question) and a domestic
separation-of-powers question (the “who” question). Moreover, if
one construes Foster in accordance with the two-step approach, then
Foster provides a useful template for modern SE doctrine. In
contrast, if one construes Foster in accordance with the one-step
approach, the case is simply a prescription for courts to engage in
arbitrary judicial decision-making by applying a fictitious intent test.
2. The political-judicial concept and NSE declarations
The preceding account of SE doctrine is incomplete in one
important respect: the history before World War II focuses on the
branch of SE doctrine involving the congressional-executive concept.
Even in the nineteenth century, though, a separate branch of SE
doctrine applied the political-judicial concept. That branch of SE
doctrine is often called the “justiciability” doctrine. 124 Traditional
justiciability doctrine involves a two-step analysis. In step one, courts
apply a treaty interpretation analysis to ascertain the content of the
international obligation. In step two, courts apply a domestic
separation-of-powers analysis to determine whether the judicial
branch is competent to enforce that particular treaty obligation. The
justiciability doctrine is similar to the constitutional doctrine,
discussed previously, in that both doctrines involve a two-step
analysis. However, the constitutional doctrine focuses on the division
of power between Congress and the executive branch, whereas the
justiciability doctrine focuses on the division of power between the
124. See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J.
INT’L L. 695, 710–15 (1995).
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political branches and the courts. 125 The justiciability doctrine does
not raise the specter of fictitious intent because courts do not
apply a treaty interpretation analysis to answer a domestic
separation-of-powers question.
During the 1970s or later, lawyers began combining the
political-judicial concept with the one-step approach. The precise
origins of this particular doctrinal shift are not entirely clear, but the
combination of the political-judicial concept with the one-step
approach is closely related to the modern practice of attaching NSE
declarations to treaties. 126 NSE declarations involve a one-step
approach because when the treatymakers adopt an NSE declaration,
they use their Article II power to control domestic implementation
directly, in a way that is not contingent upon the content of the
international obligation. 127
The practice of ratifying treaties subject to NSE declarations
raises two distinct sets of questions. First, what is the proper
interpretation of NSE declarations? The United States ratified three
human rights treaties with NSE declarations in the period from 1992
to 1994. 128 Those were the first treaties that the United States
ratified subject to NSE declarations. Congress and the executive
branch explained those declarations in accordance with the private
right of action doctrine, which is a variant of the political-judicial
concept. 129 However, more recent political branch practice suggests
that NSE declarations are properly construed in accordance with the
congressional-executive concept or the federal-state concept, not the
political-judicial concept. 130

125. See APPENDIX (summarizing the varieties of NSE doctrines). For an explanation of
the constitutional doctrine, see supra notes 51–57 and accompanying text. For an explanation
of the distinction between the one-step and two-step approaches, see supra notes 77–82
and accompanying text.
126. See Sloss, supra note 50.
127. See David L. Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy,
36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 35–36 (2002).
128. See Sloss, supra note 64, at 131–32.
129. See APPENDIX; see also Sloss, supra note 64, at 152–96 (defending interpretation of
NSE declarations in accordance with the private right of action doctrine); Sloss, supra note
108, at 106–10 (discussing origins of the private right of action doctrine).
130. See supra notes 36–45 and accompanying text.
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Second, the practice of ratifying treaties subject to NSE
declarations raises constitutional questions. Several scholars have
challenged the constitutional validity of NSE declarations; 131 others
have defended the practice. 132 In my view, much of the constitutional
debate has been off-target because scholars attempt to answer the
constitutional question without addressing the interpretive question.
One cannot present a coherent analysis of the constitutional issues
without first establishing the correct interpretation of NSE
declarations. Space does not permit a detailed analysis of the
constitutional issues here. Suffice it to say that, in my view, the NSE
declarations are constitutionally valid if they are construed in
accordance with the congressional-executive concept, the federalstate concept, or the private right of action doctrine. 133 Professor
Bradley has defended the constitutional validity of NSE declarations
on the theory that such declarations should be construed in
accordance with the political-judicial concept, and that the
declarations bar judicial enforcement of the subject treaties by all
litigants in all cases 134—I call this the no judicial enforcement
doctrine. 135 Bradley’s argument relies on the unstated premise that
Article II grants the treatymakers an unlimited power to order courts
to refrain from applying supreme federal law. The ALI’s Discussion
Draft also appears to endorse this position. 136 As I have explained
elsewhere, Professor Bradley’s position is at odds with the principle

131. See, e.g., Thomas Buergenthal, Modern Constitutions and Human Rights Treaties,
36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 211, 221 (1997); Malvina Halberstam, United States
Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 49, 64–70 (1997).
132. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and
Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399 (2000); Vázquez, supra note 87, at 667–85.
133. See Sloss, supra note 50.
134. Curtis A. Bradley, Self-Execution and Treaty Duality, 2008 S UP. C T.
R EV. 131, 137–40.
135. See APPENDIX.
136. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 cmts. b, c & f, reporter’s notes 2 & 4 (AM. LAW INST.,
Discussion Draft 2015).
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of judicial independence and with entrenched Supreme Court
doctrine protecting the due process rights of criminal defendants. 137
Regardless, debates about the constitutional validity of NSE
declarations are largely theoretical. From a practical standpoint,
judicial application of a fictitious intent test is the main problem
associated with modern NSE doctrine. The fictitious intent problem
does not arise when the treatymakers adopt an NSE declaration
because, in that case, the treatymakers have expressed their
intentions in a concrete form. Similarly, the fictitious intent problem
does not arise when courts apply a two-step approach (as in the
justiciability doctrine), because under the two-step approach courts
do not apply a treaty interpretation analysis to answer a domestic
separation-of-powers question. However, fictitious intent becomes a
serious problem when the treatymakers have not adopted an NSE
declaration and courts apply a one-step approach in conjunction with
the political-judicial concept. In such cases, courts apply a treaty
interpretation analysis to answer a question that treaties do not
typically address: whether domestic courts are the appropriate
government agents to enforce U.S. treaty obligations. Part III
analyzes the Supreme Court decision in Medellín to show how the
one-step approach induces courts to engage in arbitrary judicial
decision-making by applying a fictitious intent test.
III. FICTITIOUS INTENT IN MEDELLÍN
The Supreme Court held in Medellín that Article 94 of the UN
Charter is not self-executing. The Court relied primarily on the
treaty text and the Senate record associated with treaty ratification to
support its conclusion that the treatymakers intended Article 94 to
be non-self-executing. 138 Unfortunately, a vast gulf separates the
actual evidence of the treatymakers’ intentions from the conclusions
that the Court reached on the basis of that evidence. Part III
examines Medellín to illustrate the problems associated with the

137. See Sloss, supra note 50. The leading Supreme Court decisions on the due process
rights of criminal defendants are Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), and United
States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987).
138. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506–11 (2008).
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fictitious intent doctrine. The first Section addresses the Court’s
opinion in Medellín. The next Section provides an independent
analysis of the Senate record associated with ratification of the UN
Charter. The final Section discusses, in more general terms, the
problems associated with judicial reliance on fictitious intent.
A. The Court’s Opinion in Medellín
Chief Justice Roberts began his textual analysis by quoting
Article 94(1), which says: “Each Member of the United Nations
undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of
Justice in any case to which it is a party.” 139 He construed the
italicized language to mean that States made a commitment “to take
future action through their political branches to comply with an ICJ
decision.” 140 Here, the Chief Justice made the classic mistake—which
is endemic in self-execution doctrine—of conflating a “when”
question with a “who” question. He correctly noted that the phrase
“undertakes to comply” is a promise of future action. 141 In
nineteenth-century terms, Article 94(1) is executory, not executed,
because treaty ratification, without more, does not accomplish the
goal to be accomplished. 142 The text of Article 94 answers the
“when” question: it is a promise of future action.
However, the text of Article 94(1) does not answer the “who”
question. The text does not support the Court’s conclusion that
compliance is to be achieved “through their political branches.” As
Roberts himself correctly noted in a different case, the “rules of
domestic law generally govern the [domestic] implementation of an
international treaty.” 143 Consistent with this understanding, the
drafters of the UN Charter did not attempt to answer the “who”
question. They did not purport to decide which branch of
government in the United States would be responsible for
compliance with ICJ decisions because they recognized that

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
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domestic law ordinarily governs the internal allocation of
responsibility for treaty implementation. 144 Therefore, the text of
Article 94(1) does not support Roberts’s conclusion that the
treatymakers intended to vest responsibility for compliance with ICJ
decisions in the political branches, rather than the courts.
Roberts turned next to Article 94(2), which states: “If any party
to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a
judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse
to the Security Council, which may . . . decide upon measures to be
taken to give effect to the judgment.” 145 Based on this language, the
Court concluded that referral to the Security Council is “the sole
remedy for noncompliance.” 146 Additionally, the Court said that the
“Charter’s provision of an express diplomatic—that is, nonjudicial—
remedy is itself evidence that ICJ judgments were not meant to be
enforceable in domestic courts.” 147 With due respect for the Chief
Justice, the text of Article 94(2) provides absolutely no support for
the conclusions he purports to derive from that text. First, the
statement that “the other party may have recourse to the Security
Council” simply identifies one option. It does not exclude other
options, as Roberts would have us believe. Second, and more
importantly, the text addresses enforcement between nation-states in
the international sphere. It says nothing whatsoever about remedies
for individuals in the domestic sphere. This should come as no
surprise because, to quote the Chief Justice again, “rules of domestic
law generally govern the [domestic] implementation of an
international treaty.” 148 The question whether an individual can
obtain a remedy in a domestic court is a question about the domestic
implementation of the treaty. The drafters of the UN Charter chose
not to answer that question because they recognized that it is a
question governed by domestic law, not international law.

144. See 1 OPPENHEIM’S I NT’L L AW § 21 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds.,
9th ed. 1992).
145. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 509 (quoting U.N. Charter art. 94, ¶ 2) (alteration in original).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 356.
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The preceding paragraphs address the entirety of Roberts’s
textual analysis in Medellín. In sum, the drafters of the UN Charter
could have said something in the text about whether Article 94 has
the status of domestic law in the United States. They could have said
something in the text about which branch of government in the
United States is responsible for ensuring compliance with ICJ
decisions. They could have said something in the text about whether
individuals have access to domestic courts in the United States to
obtain remedies for violations of Article 94. However, the drafters of
the UN Charter chose not to address any of those questions because
they assumed that the answers to those questions would be governed
by U.S. domestic law! Therefore, insofar as Roberts relied on the
treaty text to support his conclusions about the treatymakers’
intentions, his reliance was misplaced. The ostensible “intent of the
treatymakers” that Roberts claimed to find on the basis of the treaty
text is sheer judicial fantasy, without foundation in any actual
agreement of the treaty’s drafters.
Roberts did not rest his decision solely on the treaty text. He
also examined the Senate record associated with treaty ratification to
support his conclusion that the treatymakers intended Article 94 to
be non-self-executing. Here, Roberts quoted three different
statements from the Senate record. 149 First, he quoted an excerpt
from Secretary of State Edward Stettinius’s report to President
Truman. 150 The quoted language repeats, almost verbatim, the
language in Article 94(2) about recourse to the Security Council.151
It says nothing whatsoever about the status of the UN Charter as
federal law in the United States or the allocation of responsibility for
treaty implementation among the branches of the U.S. government.

149. See The Charter of the United Nations for the Maintenance of International Peace
and Security: Hearings Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 79th Cong. (1945)
[hereinafter SFRC Hearings].
150. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 510. Medellín quotes the Report to the President on the
Results of the San Francisco Conference by the Chairman of the United States Delegation, the
Secretary of State (June 26, 1945) [hereinafter Stettinius Report], reprinted in SFRC
Hearings, supra note 149, at 34–206.
151. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 510.
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Second, Roberts quoted a statement by Leo Pasvolsky, a Special
Assistant to the Secretary of State. Pasvolsky said: “When the [ICJ]
has rendered a judgment and one of the parties refuses to accept it,
then the dispute becomes political rather than legal. It is as a political
dispute that the matter is referred to the Security Council.” 152
Viewed in context, it is abundantly clear that Pasvolsky was referring
to disputes between nation-states on the international plane. 153 He
was not referring to disputes between individuals and state
governments in the United States—the type of dispute at issue in
Medellín. Here it is helpful to recall a distinction that Chief Justice
John Marshall made more than two centuries ago between a case
“carried before a court as an individual claim” and “a national
demand made upon the nation [where] [t]he parties were the two
nations.” 154 Marshall said that domestic courts are competent to
adjudicate a case “carried before a court as an individual claim,” but
a demand made upon the nation “is not a case for judicial
cognizance.” 155 In Marshall’s terms, Medellín’s habeas corpus
petition was a case “carried before a court as an individual claim.” In
contrast, Pasvolsky’s statement in the Senate hearings addressed “a
national demand made upon the nation.” Pasvolsky neither stated
nor implied that domestic courts are not competent to adjudicate
individual claims that are based, in part, on Article 94.
Third, Roberts quoted a statement by Mr. Charles Fahy, the
State Department Legal Advisor. Roberts cited Fahy’s statement to
support the Court’s conclusion that “Article 94(2) provides the
exclusive means of enforcement” for ICJ decisions. 156 Here, Roberts
used the term “exclusive” to signify that the treatymakers intended
to preclude domestic judicial enforcement. However, Fahy’s
statement does not support that inference. Fahy said that “there is
no provision for the enforcement of such [ICJ] decisions unless the

152. Id. (quoting SFRC Hearings, supra note 149, at 286 (statement of Leo Pasvolsky)).
153. See SFRC Hearings, supra note 149, at 281–87 (statement of Leo Pasvolsky).
154. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 609, 613 (1800) (statement of Congressman John Marshall).
155. See id. at 605–15; see also Michael P. Van Alstine, Taking Care of John Marshall’s
Political Ghost, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 93, 123 (2008) (providing detailed commentary on
Marshall’s speech).
156. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 510.
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failure to comply constitutes a threat to the peace or breach of the
peace.” 157 As above, the context makes it perfectly clear that Fahy
was talking about enforcement between nation-states on the
international plane. He was not talking about enforcement by
individuals on the domestic plane. Granted, the UN Charter and the
ICJ Statute contain “no provision for the enforcement” of ICJ
decisions on the domestic plane; however, the decision by the
Charter’s drafters to say nothing about domestic judicial
enforcement is not evidence of an intention to preclude domestic
judicial enforcement in the United States. To the contrary, it is
evidence of a widely shared understanding that the United States
would decide for itself, in accordance with its own domestic legal
rules, whether and how to provide for domestic judicial enforcement
of the treaty obligation to comply with ICJ decisions.
The record of a different treaty negotiation in the 1940s
confirms this view. At the 1949 meeting of the UN Commission on
Human Rights, the United States proposed an amendment to the
draft Covenant on Human Rights. The proposed amendment
provided in part: “The provisions of this Covenant shall not
themselves become effective as domestic law.” 158 The representative
from the Philippines objected to the U.S. proposal. He explained
that, in the Philippines, “all international treaties and conventions,
when ratified, were incorporated without further formalities in
domestic law.” The U.S. proposal, even if adopted, “could not
change the constitutional rule of the Philippines.” 159 The Lebanese
representative added that the appropriate mechanism for
incorporating the Covenant into domestic law “was entirely a
question of the constitutional law of States; there was no reason why
the Covenant should interfere with the application of that law.”160

157. See Compulsory Jurisdiction, International Court of Justice: Hearings on S. Res. 196
Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 79th Cong. 142 (1946) (statement of
Charles Fahy, State Department Legal Adviser).
158. U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, Draft Int’l Covenant on
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/224 (May 23, 1949).
159. U.N. ESCOR, 5th Sess., 125th mtg. at 6–7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.125
(June 22, 1949).
160. Id. at 8.
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After further discussion, the Commission voted against the U.S.
proposal. 161 The Commission’s rejection of the proposed U.S.
amendment manifested a shared understanding that the question
whether the Covenant would be directly applicable as domestic law
would be governed by the domestic law of individual States, not by
the terms of the Covenant. The diplomats who negotiated the UN
Charter in 1945 had a similar understanding.
In sum, Roberts’s treaty interpretation analysis in Medellín is akin
to analyzing regulations promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to answer a question about California tort law.
The fact that SEC regulations say nothing about tort remedies in
California does not mean that there are no tort remedies in
California. Roberts was misled by the one-step approach—it induced
him to perform a treaty interpretation analysis to answer a question
that the treaty does not answer.
B. Independent Analysis of the Senate Record
The Senate record associated with ratification of the UN Charter
consists of the following documents: Secretary of State Stettinius’s
Report to the President (“Stettinius Report”), 162 the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Report (“SFRC Report”), 163 the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee Hearings (“SFRC Hearings”), 164 and
records of the Senate floor debate reproduced in the Congressional
Record (“floor debate”). 165 I searched those documents to determine
what the treatymakers said about self-execution.
The term “self-executing” does not appear in the Stettinius
Report, the SFRC Report, or the SFRC Hearings. 166 It does appear
in three places in the Congressional Record. Senator Hill said that
the United States Constitution is not self-executing. Specifically, he
161. Id. at 17.
162. Stettinius Report, supra note 150.
163. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, S.
EXEC. REP. NO. 79-8 (1945) (hereinafter “SFRC REPORT”).
164. SFRC Hearings, supra note 149.
165. See 91 CONG. REC. 7,941–8,190 (1945).
166. See Stettinius Report, supra note 150; SFRC REPORT, supra note 163; SFRC
Hearings, supra note 149.
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said the Constitution “proved to be a tremendous step . . . . But it
could be only a step, for no such document, however wisely or
prophetically drawn, can be self-executing.” 167 He added: “And so it
is with the Charter of the United Nations Organization. It is a step,
a magnificent and hopeful step, for peace can never be achieved if we
are afraid even to try.” 168 Obviously, this statement says nothing
about the allocation of responsibility for implementing the Charter
among the branches of the federal government.
Senator White used the term “self-executing” to describe the
proposed Article 43 agreement between the United States and the
United Nations. (Article 43 of the Charter envisions agreements
between the United Nations and member states “to make available
to the Security Council . . . armed forces, assistance, and
facilities.” 169) Referring to the anticipated Article 43 agreement, he
said that the agreement “will not be of itself self-executing. It will call
for the appointment of officials; it will call for the expenditure of
public funds. Those will be authorized, I take it, by the Congress of
the United States acting in its legislative capacity.” 170
Senator Revercomb was the only senator who used the term
“self-executing” to refer specifically to the Charter. He said:
This Charter is not self-executing. It requires future implementing
legislation. It requires future legislation to fix . . . the powers and
the limitations of the [U.S.] representatives who will take part in
administering the new organization. Even legislation will be
required fixing the appointment of our representative [to the
United Nations] and the method of his appointment. Likewise, the
Congress will act later upon the question of the number of troops
and the armaments to be used in effectuating the purposes of the
Charter and also the extent to which such troops may be used. 171

This statement is the most detailed statement by any member of
the legislative or executive branch addressing the need for legislation

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
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to implement the Charter. Notably, Senator Revercomb did not
suggest that legislation would be needed to implement the Article 94
obligation to comply with ICJ decisions.
In addition to searching for the term “self-executing,” I reviewed
the Senate record to find answers to three questions: (1) did the
U.S. treatymakers believe that Article 94 of the UN Charter would
automatically supersede conflicting state laws? (the federal-state
concept); (2) did they believe that Article 94 would require
implementing legislation to authorize federal executive action? (the
congressional-executive concept); and (3) did they believe that the
Article 94 obligation to comply with ICJ decisions was directly
enforceable in domestic courts (the political-judicial concept)? The
remainder of this Section addresses these questions.
First, several Senators affirmed the principle that the UN
Charter, when ratified, would be the supreme law of the land.
Senator Ferguson said: “Mr. President, when we ratify this treaty it
will become the supreme law of the land, because the Constitution
provides that a treaty ratified and consented to by the Senate shall be
the supreme law of the land.” 172 Similarly, Senator Thomas said:
“[W]hen we enter into this agreement, and when the United
Nations Charter becomes a treaty accepted by us . . . [w]e agree to
every provision in it when we accept it. Therefore . . . the treaty
becomes the supreme law of the land.” 173 Senator Lucas quoted the
language of the Supremacy Clause and said:
The treaty becomes the highest law of the land. We should keep
this clearly in mind as we discharge the duty of our offices . . . .
When we enter into this treaty we ought to do so with an
understanding of the spirit of the Constitution, which makes
treaties the supreme law of the land . . . . 174

There is not a single statement in the Senate record contradicting
this view. Moreover, as of 1945, the prevailing understanding of the
Supremacy Clause was that “supreme law of the land” meant that a
172. 91 CONG. REC. 7,999 (1945).
173. 91 CONG. REC. 8,025 (1945).
174. Id.; see also 91 CONG. REC. 8,127 (1945) (statement of Sen. Wiley) (“This Charter,
when it is approved by the nations, will be the supreme law of the land.”).

1729

8.SLOSS.AA (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/3/2016 11:26 AM

2015

treaty supersedes conflicting state laws. 175 Therefore—although there
is no evidence that the treatymakers specifically intended Article 94
to supersede conflicting state laws, nor is there evidence that they
anticipated any such conflict—key Senators and executive officials
probably shared the belief that the UN Charter, including Article 94,
would supersede conflicting state laws if a conflict ever arose. In any
case, there is not a scintilla of evidence to support the view that the
treatymakers made a conscious choice to opt out of the
Constitution’s treaty supremacy rule when the United States ratified
the UN Charter.
The Senate record includes numerous statements addressing the
need for legislation to implement particular Charter provisions.
However, no legislative or executive officer stated or implied that
legislation would be needed to implement U.S. obligations under
Article 94. The Stettinius Report said that legislation would be
needed to implement Articles 104 and 105 (which involve the “legal
capacity” and “privileges and immunities” of the United Nations and
associated personnel). 176 The SFRC Report indicated that legislation
would be needed to determine the scope of “authority of the United
States delegate” to the UN Security Council. 177 Some nongovernmental witnesses said that legislation would be needed to
authorize “the establishment of an International Monetary Fund and
an International Bank.” 178
Anna Lord Strauss, the President of the National League of
Women Voters, presented the most detailed analysis of the need for
implementing legislation. She identified two categories of legislation.
First, legislation would be “needed following ratification to get the
Organization into operation.” 179 Under this heading, she included:
175. See Sloss, supra note 50.
176. See Stettinius Report, supra note 150, at 134–37.
177. SFRC REPORT, supra note 163, at 8–9; see also SFRC Hearings, supra note 149, at
445–46 (statement of Dr. Helen Dwight Reid) (“We consider that the authority granted the
United States delegate on the Security Council is a domestic question and should be handled
separately [by legislation], not by amendment or reservation to the Charter.”).
178. SFRC Hearings, supra note 149, at 448 (statement of Morris Llewellyn Cooke); see
also id. at 473 (resolution adopted by the Independent Citizens’ Committee of the Arts,
Sciences, and Professions, Inc.).
179. SFRC Hearings, supra note 149, at 426.
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legislation to define “the powers of the United States delegate on
the Security Council,” “[a]rrangements concerning United States
forces to be placed at the disposal of the Security Council,” and
“[a]ppropriations for our share of the United Nations Organization
expenses.” 180 Her second category involved “longer-range legislation
connected with the Organization.” 181 She included in this category
legislation related to U.S. “membership in the subsidiary
organizations of the Economic and Social Council” and
“[a]cceptance by the United States of the optional clause giving
compulsory jurisdiction to the World Court.” 182
The Senate record makes clear that the executive branch, the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and various non-governmental
witnesses carefully analyzed the need for legislation to implement
various Charter provisions. Collectively, they identified several
different Charter provisions that required implementing legislation.
However, there is not a single statement in the hundreds of pages of
documents comprising the Senate record suggesting that legislation
would be needed to implement U.S. obligations under Article 94 of
the Charter. The Court’s conclusion in Medellín that the United
States made an affirmative decision, at the time of ratification, to
require legislative implementation for Article 94 is sheer judicial
fantasy, without a shred of supporting evidence.
The final question concerns the role of domestic courts in
implementing the Charter. The SFRC Report does not address
domestic judicial enforcement. 183 The Stettinius Report includes one
reference to domestic courts. It says: “The International Court of
Justice . . . has an important part to play in developing international
law just as the courts of England and America have helped to form
the common law.” 184 Apart from that statement, no government
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. The reference to the “optional clause” is a reference to Article 36(2) of the ICJ
Statute, which provides: “The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that
they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement . . . the jurisdiction of
the Court” regarding certain types of cases. Statute of the International Court of Justice art.
36, ¶ 2, June 26, 1945.
183. See SFRC REPORT, supra note 163.
184. Stettinius Report, supra note 150, at 121.
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official who testified during the SFRC Hearings discussed the role of
domestic courts in implementing the Charter. 185 Several nongovernmental witnesses made passing references to domestic courts
during the SFRC Hearings, 186 but no witness specifically addressed
the question whether U.S. obligations under Article 94 would be
enforceable in domestic courts. The Senate devoted six days of floor
time to discussing the Charter. During floor debate, not a single
Senator expressed a view about whether the Charter would be
enforceable in domestic courts. The statement that comes closest to
addressing that issue is a statement by Senator Walter George. He said:
Surely no American should scoff at international law, because time
after time our own Supreme Court has recognized the law of
nations, and has given effect to the law of nations, which is but
another term for international law, and has applied the principles of
international law in the adjudications made by our own courts. 187

Based on this statement, one could infer that Senator George
believed that some of the Charter’s provisions would be enforceable
in U.S. courts. Still, he said nothing about Article 94, and his
statement does not express a consensus Senate view.
In sum, the Court’s opinion in Medellín might be construed to
mean that Article 94 is not enforceable in domestic courts because
the treatymakers decided, at the time of ratification, to bar domestic
judicial enforcement. However, analysis of the Senate record
demonstrates persuasively that the President and Senate did not
make any such decision. The hundreds of pages of documents
comprising the Senate record do not include a single statement by
any legislative or executive official expressing any opinion about

185. During his oral testimony, Secretary Stettinius repeated the statement quoted
above. See SFRC Hearings, supra note 149, at 219.
186. See, e.g., SFRC Hearings, supra note 149, at 393 (statement of W.E.B. DuBois)
(urging the United States to declare that members of all races are entitled to equal “justice
before the courts”); id. at 468–69 (statement of Thomasina W. Johnson) (comparing certain
features of the ICJ Statute to domestic courts); id. at 561 (statement of Elizabeth A. Smart)
(praising the decision to refer disputes to an international court, and saying: “We recall that the
internal feuding between neighbors of medieval times was finally absolutely abolished when
men were persuaded to take their disputes to the courts instead of resorting to arms”).
187. 91 CONG. REC. 8,110 (1945).
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whether Article 94 is enforceable in domestic courts. Insofar as the
majority opinion in Medellín suggests otherwise, there is not a shred
of evidence to support the Court’s conclusion.
C. The Problem of Fictitious Intent
Unfortunately, Roberts’s opinion in Medellín is consistent with a
long line of lower court decisions that reach conclusions about selfexecution on the basis of a fictitious, judicially created “intent of the
treatymakers.” 188 Judicial reliance on fictitious intent is the product
of a flawed methodology that is, in turn, the product of a mistaken
interpretation of Foster v. Neilson. As explained above, Marshall
applied a two-step approach in Foster. He performed a treaty
interpretation analysis to answer an international law question and he
performed a domestic separation-of-powers analysis to answer a
domestic separation-of-powers question. 189 However, contemporary
lawyers believe that Marshall applied a one-step approach, in which
he performed a treaty interpretation analysis to answer a domestic
separation-of-powers question. This misinterpretation of Foster has
become so deeply embedded in contemporary legal culture that
commentators routinely refer to the one-step approach as “Fostertype non-self-execution.” 190
In Medellín, Roberts relied on this mistaken interpretation of
Foster to justify his view that courts have an “obligation to interpret
treaty provisions to determine whether they are self-executing.”191
The asserted “obligation” is problematic because the question
whether a treaty is self-executing is a domestic separation-of-powers
question. The diplomats who draft treaties do not typically use
treaties to answer separation-of-powers questions. Hence, the view

188. See, e.g., Int’l Café, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Café Int’l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274
(11th Cir. 2001); see also Sloss, supra note 127, at 79–80 (analyzing the Eleventh Circuit
opinion in Int’l Café).
189. See supra notes 108–23 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 134, at 134; Vázquez, supra note 87, at 602; David H.
Moore, Law(Makers) of the Land: The Doctrine of Treaty Non-Self-Execution, 122 HARV. L.
REV. FORUM 32, 32 n.4 (2009).
191. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 514 (2008) (citing Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S.
253, 314 (1829)).
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that courts are obligated to perform a treaty interpretation analysis
to answer a domestic separation-of-powers question leads, almost
inevitably, to judicial reliance on fictitious intent. Judges believe they
are required, as a matter of legal doctrine, to base their self-execution
decisions on treaty interpretation. Treaties rarely address the selfexecution question because treaty negotiators view self-execution as
a domestic legal question. Since the treaty says nothing about selfexecution and courts believe they must perform a treaty
interpretation analysis to decide whether a treaty is SE or NSE,
judges are effectively backed into a corner where judicial creation of
a fictitious intent provides the only escape hatch.
Judicial reliance on fictitious intent creates three distinct
problems. First, judicial decision-making is arbitrary. We expect
courts to decide cases by applying established legal principles to new
factual situations. Application of law to fact necessarily involves some
discretion, but judicial discretion is bounded by the need to conform
to established legal principles. With respect to SE doctrine, though,
established principles do not impose any meaningful boundaries on
judicial discretion. The established principles direct judges to decide
cases by determining whether the treatymakers intended the treaty to
be self-executing. In the vast majority of cases, the treatymakers had
no intention regarding self-execution. (Medellín is a good example.)
Hence, judges are free to reach any decision that supports their policy
preferences, without fear of contravening a non-existent “intent.”
The second problem relates to treaty compliance. When the
President ratifies a treaty, he makes a binding commitment on behalf
of the nation that the United States will comply with its treaty
obligations. Generally speaking, the Senate does not consent to
ratification unless the Senate agrees, by the requisite two-thirds
majority, that it is in the national interest of the United States to
comply with the treaty. Therefore, the act of ratification is itself
powerful evidence that the President and Senate intend to comply
with the treaty. 192 When courts are presented with a self-execution
question, they would probably reach a result consistent with the

192. See Duncan B. Hollis, Treaties—A Cinderella Story, 102 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC.
412, 413–414 (2008).
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treatymakers’ intentions if they asked whether the treatymakers
intended to comply, instead of asking whether they intended the
treaty to be self-executing. If the treatymakers did intend to comply
(which is usually true) and a finding of self-execution is necessary to
achieve treaty compliance (which is sometimes true), a self-execution
holding would give effect to the treatymakers’ intentions. 193 Instead,
courts often find that a treaty is NSE in circumstances where that
finding results in non-compliance, even though the treatymakers
fully intended to comply. (Again, Medellín is a good example.) In
short, judicial reliance on fictitious intent tends to subvert the
treatymakers’ actual intention to comply with the treaty.
The third problem relates to accountability. The Constitution
grants the federal political branches power to violate a binding treaty
obligation. Scholars debate whether this power belongs exclusively
to Congress or whether the President has an independent power to
violate treaties. Regardless, no reputable scholar claims that the
Constitution grants state governments, or federal courts, the power
to violate treaties. Even so, as a practical matter, NSE doctrine grants
state government officials and federal courts the power to make
decisions that are attributable to the United States under
international law and that constitute a violation of U.S. treaty
obligations. Judges and state officers try to evade responsibility for
their actions by claiming that the political branches decided that the
relevant treaty is NSE and that the treaty violation is merely a
consequence of that decision. However, in most cases, the claim that
the treatymakers decided that the treaty is NSE relies on a judicially
created, fictitious intent. Consequently, the United States breaches
its treaty obligations, even though the President and Senate made a
purposeful decision at the time of ratification to comply with the
treaty and no politically accountable federal official ever purposefully

193. To be clear, I think the best approach to self-execution analysis is to discard the
“intent” test altogether, except in cases where the treatymakers have expressed their intentions
clearly and unambiguously. However, if we must retain an “intent” test—because it is so
deeply embedded in current doctrine—then the “intent” test should focus on an actual,
discernable intent, rather than a judicially created, fictitious intent. The intent to comply with
the treaty (or not) is an actual, discernable intent. The intent to make the treaty self-executing
or non-self-executing is, in most cases, a judicially created, fictitious intent.
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decided to violate the treaty. In short, we violate our treaty
commitments, but no government officer is accountable. Like a
modern Frankenstein, the fictitious intent doctrine has brought
Madison’s monster to life.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Part IV provides recommendations for the political branches and
the courts. I divide these recommendations into two parts.
Recommendations for the political branches are designed to help
ensure that they express their intentions clearly. Recommendations
for the courts are designed to establish an appropriate set of default
rules for courts to apply when the political branches fail to express
their intentions clearly.
A. Recommendations for the Political Branches: Getting the
Terminology Right
For better or worse, modern SE doctrine focuses on the intent of
the treatymakers to answer questions about the domestic allocation
of authority over treaty implementation. Treaties rarely answer those
questions. The discrepancy between judicial doctrine and the
practice of treaty negotiators has spawned the fictitious intent
problem. Treatymakers can avoid the fictitious intent problem by
expressing their intentions clearly in the form of unilateral conditions
included in the U.S. instrument of ratification. Happily, the
treatymakers have begun to do so by adopting declarations
specifying that a particular treaty is SE or NSE. 194 Unfortunately,
political branch explanations of those declarations have been
inconsistent. Those explanations have vacillated among the
congressional-executive concept, the federal-state concept, and the
political-judicial concept. The President and Senate should agree
on clear definitions of terms and apply those terms consistently in
accordance with agreed definitions.
The treatymakers should define the terms “self-executing” and
“non-self-executing” in accordance with the congressional-executive

194.
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concept. Under this definition, an SE treaty provides a rule of
conduct for federal executive officials, but an NSE treaty is not law
for the executive branch unless it is implemented by Congress. The
treatymakers should use different terminology (discussed below) to
express the federal-state concept and the political-judicial concept.
Using the terms “self-executing” and “non-self-executing” to refer
to all three concepts without distinguishing among them does not
serve any legitimate purpose. Of course, consistent usage of terms in
accordance with the political-judicial concept, as recommended by
the ALI reporters, 195 would also promote greater clarity.
Nevertheless, there are several reasons to favor the congressionalexecutive definition over the political-judicial definition.
First, the proposed definition is consistent with the dominant
concept of self-execution that prevailed from the Founding until
World War II. The federal-state concept was not invented until after
1945. The most important sources of authority on SE doctrine
before 1945 were legislative and executive materials, not judicial
materials. 196 Most legislative and executive authorities use the
SE/NSE terminology in accordance with the congressionalexecutive concept, not the political-judicial concept. 197
Second, the proposed definition is consistent with most Supreme
Court authority. Part III of the Court’s opinion in Medellín v. Texas
indisputably applied the congressional-executive concept, not the
political-judicial concept. 198 Granted, other portions of the Court’s
opinion can reasonably be construed in accordance with the federalstate concept or the political-judicial concept but that merely shows
that the Court did not consistently apply a single SE concept
throughout the opinion. The key passage from Chief Justice
Marshall’s opinion in Foster v. Neilson is ambiguous, but the best
interpretation of that passage is consistent with the congressionalexecutive concept. 199 Other leading Supreme Court opinions on self195. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106(1) & cmt. b (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2015).
196. See supra notes 51–65 & 81–86 and accompanying text.
197. See Sloss, supra note 50.
198. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 525–30 (2008).
199. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829); Sloss, supra note 47, at 153–62.
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execution—including Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint
Corp., 200 Cook v. United States, 201 Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. City of
Knoxville, 202 and Whitney v. Robertson 203—apply the congressionalexecutive concept, not the political-judicial concept.
Third, the proposed definition is consistent with the most
significant political branch practice in the past decade. In September
2008, about six months after the Supreme Court decided Medellín,
the Senate provided its advice and consent for seventy-eight treaties
in four days. 204 Careful analysis of the Senate record demonstrates
that the Senate understood the terms SE and NSE in accordance
with the congressional-executive concept, not the politicaljudicial concept. 205
If the treatymakers want to say that a treaty is not supreme over
state law, they can adopt a declaration that the treaty does not
supersede conflicting state laws. 206 Here, one must distinguish
between the concepts of “supremacy” and “preemption.” If a treaty
is “supreme” over state law, the treaty supersedes conflicting state
laws, but states may enact laws that do not conflict with the treaty. In
contrast, if a treaty “preempts” state law, states are barred from
enacting regulations in the field “occupied” by the treaty, even if
200. 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) (defining “self-executing” to mean that “no domestic
legislation is required to give the Convention the force of law in the United States”).
201. 288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933) (“For in a strict sense the Treaty was self-executing, in
that no legislation was necessary to authorize executive action pursuant to its provisions.”).
202. 227 U.S. 39, 49 (1913) (concluding that a treaty did not extend the life of a U.S.
patent because the treaty “required legislation to become effective”).
203. 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (“When the [treaty] stipulations are not self-executing they
can only be enforced [by the executive] pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect . . . .”).
204. See 154 CONG. REC. 20,166–74 (2008); 154 CONG. REC. 21,775–78 (2008); 154
CONG REC. 22,464–65 (2008).
205. See supra notes 36–42 and accompanying text. As noted above, the Senate
explained the NSE declaration for the Disabilities Convention in terms of the federal-state
concept. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
206. One could argue that such a declaration is invalid because it conflicts with the text
of the Supremacy Clause. See Michael D. Ramsey, A Textual Approach to Treaty Non-SelfExecution, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1639 (2016). I agree that, as an original matter, the Framers of
the Constitution did not believe that Article II granted the treatymakers the power to opt out
of the treaty supremacy rule. However, under the new constitutional understanding that
emerged from the Bricker Amendment controversy in the 1950s, the treatymakers do have
such a power. See Sloss, supra note 50.
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those regulations do not conflict with the treaty. 207 In framing
unilateral declarations, the treatymakers should distinguish clearly
among the concepts of self-execution, supremacy, and preemption.
Declarations that a treaty does not supersede conflicting state laws
should be used infrequently because such declarations, in Madison’s
terms, would put the head “under the direction of the members.”208
Cases where the political branches make a conscious choice to
subordinate the national interest in treaty compliance to the
discretion of the fifty states will arise rarely, if at all.
If the treatymakers want a treaty to be enforceable by federal
executive officials, but they want to limit private judicial
enforcement, they can adopt a declaration that the treaty is “selfexecuting,” but it does not “create a private cause of action,” or it
does not “confer private rights enforceable in U.S. courts.” Indeed,
the treatymakers have adopted several such declarations in recent
years. 209 Here again, the terminology is important. If a treaty does
not “create a private cause of action,” civil plaintiffs may not invoke
the treaty offensively, but civil and criminal defendants may invoke
the treaty as the basis for a defense. 210 If a treaty does not “confer
private rights enforceable in U.S. courts,” then private litigants are
barred from invoking the treaty either offensively or defensively, but
the federal government can sue to enforce the treaty. 211 In practice,
the treatymakers have used the phrase “does not confer private

207. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767
(1994). The Court sometimes uses the terms “conflict preemption” and “field preemption” to
distinguish between “supremacy” and “preemption.” However, I agree with Professor Gardbaum
that it is preferable to use the terms “supremacy” and “preemption” to avoid confusion.
208. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison).
209. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. The Due Process Clause limits the
power of the political branches to preclude a criminal defendant from raising a treaty-based
defense. See supra note 137 and accompanying text; see also David L. Sloss, The Constitutional
Right to a Treaty Preemption Defense, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 971, 972–73 (2009).
210. See Vázquez, supra note 124, at 719–22. This approach corresponds to the private
right of action doctrine. See APPENDIX.
211. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 3312(b)(2) (2012) (“No State law, or the application thereof,
may be declared invalid as to any person or circumstance on the ground that the provision or
application is inconsistent with [NAFTA], except in an action brought by the United States for
the purpose of declaring such law or application invalid.”). This approach corresponds to the
no private enforcement doctrine. See APPENDIX.
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rights” primarily for treaties that are not intended to benefit private
parties. To clarify this point, the treatymakers should express the idea
that a treaty “does not confer private rights” in the form of an
“understanding,” rather than a “declaration.” An “understanding” is
an interpretive statement designed to clarify the international
meaning of the treaty. In contrast, a “declaration” is a unilateral
statement that can be used to control the domestic application of the
treaty without modifying the international obligation. 212
Finally, the treatymakers should avoid using the term “not
judicially enforceable.” The ALI Discussion Draft uses similar
terminology213 but that terminology is problematic. If the goal is to
limit private judicial enforcement, the terminology discussed in the
preceding paragraph is preferable because it preserves the option of a
suit by the federal government to enforce the treaty. If the
treatymakers want to say that federal executive officials lack authority
to implement the treaty until Congress enacts implementing
legislation, a declaration that the treaty is “not self-executing” is
appropriate. However, there does not appear to be any valid reason
for adopting the position that federal executive officials are
authorized to implement the treaty (self-executing) but they may not
file suit to enforce the treaty (not judicially enforceable). Indeed,
there is no evidence that the treatymakers or the courts have ever
endorsed this position. Moreover, a declaration that a treaty is “not
judicially enforceable” would raise difficult constitutional issues
because it implies that the treatymakers can use their Article II power
to order state and federal courts to refrain from applying supreme
federal law. That position is difficult to reconcile with the principle of
judicial independence and with entrenched Supreme Court doctrine
protecting the due process rights of criminal defendants. 214

212. For definitions of the terms “understanding” and “declaration,” see COMM. ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, GENOCIDE CONVENTION, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 99-2, at 15–17 (1985).
213. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106(1) & cmt. b (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2015).
214. See supra note 137 and accompanying text; see also Sloss, supra note 50.
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B. Recommendations for the Courts: Getting the Presumptions Right
The ALI Discussion Draft says: “The case law has not established
a presumption for or against self-execution, in the sense of a clear
statement or default rule . . . .” 215 However, if one discriminates
among different concepts of self-execution, it becomes apparent that
well-established legal principles support different presumptions in
different contexts. First, and most importantly, courts should adopt a
presumption that the treatymakers did not have any intention
regarding self-execution, unless they expressed their intention clearly.
Or, to state the point differently, courts should adopt a presumption
that self-execution is not a treaty interpretation question unless the
treatymakers adopted explicit language addressing self-execution in
the treaty text or in the U.S. instrument of ratification. This
presumption would bring judicial decision-making in line with the
actual practice of the government officials who negotiate and ratify
treaties. The presumption is necessary to remedy the fictitious intent
problem, which is the central problem with modern SE doctrine. In
accordance with this presumption, courts should resort to default
rules, unless the treatymakers adopt explicit language addressing selfexecution in the treaty text or in the instrument of ratification. The
appropriate default rule depends on whether the issue presented
involves the congressional-executive concept, the federal-state
concept, or the political-judicial concept.
First, consider the federal-state concept. As noted above, it is
important to distinguish between “supremacy” and “preemption.”
Absent an explicit declaration (or treaty text) to the contrary, courts
should presume that a treaty supersedes conflicting state law (a
presumption in favor of supremacy) but it does not preempt nonconflicting state law (a presumption against preemption). The
presumption against preemption is justified by the fact that courts
apply a presumption against preemption in the statutory context. 216
In contrast, the presumption in favor of supremacy is justified by the
215. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 reporter’s note 3 (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2015).
216. See David Moore, Treaties and the Presumption Against Preemption, 2015 BYU L.
REV. 1555 (2016).
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text and original understanding of the Supremacy Clause. 217
Moreover, the policy considerations that persuaded the founders to
adopt the treaty supremacy rule—fears that actions by state and local
officers could trigger a breach of U.S. treaty obligations, contrary to
the wishes of the federal political branches—also support a
presumption in favor of treaty supremacy. In short, the presumption
in favor of treaty supremacy is necessary to tame Madison’s monster
and to ensure that the authority of the nation is not subordinate to
the authority of its constituent parts.
Consider, next, the congressional-executive concept. The
Discussion Draft’s “no presumption” rule makes sense as applied to
the constitutional doctrine. If a court asks whether a treaty is
constitutionally SE or constitutionally NSE, the relevant authorities
do not support a presumption either way. However, if courts are
applying a one-step approach (as in the intent doctrine), the
appropriate presumption depends upon the relationship between the
treaty and federal statutes. If the treaty conflicts with a prior federal
statute, the presumption against implied repeals 218—which the Court
has applied in numerous cases involving conflicts between treaties
and statutes 219—effectively creates a presumption in favor of non-selfexecution. However, if the treaty does not conflict with a prior
federal statute, the President’s duty to execute treaties, rooted in the
Take Care Clause, establishes a presumption in favor of selfexecution. 220 Either presumption should be rebuttable if the
treatymakers adopt a clear statement in the treaty text or in the
instrument of ratification. In accordance with the recommended
terminology, the clear statement should use the language of
“self-execution.”

217. See MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 39–
46, 162–63, 284–86 (2007).
218. The presumption against implied repeals is a canon of statutory interpretation that
directs courts to adopt a rebuttable presumption that Congress did not intend to repeal an
earlier law when it enacted a later law. The principle also applies to the relationship between an
earlier treaty and a later statute, or an earlier statute and a later treaty.
219. See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933); United States v. Gue
Lim, 176 U.S. 459, 465 (1900); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 549 (1884).
220. See Edward T. Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 331 (2008).
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Next, consider the political-judicial concept. In this context,
courts should distinguish the question whether a treaty creates a
private right of action from other questions related to judicial
enforcement. Here, the presumption against implied rights of action
under federal statutes supports a presumption against private rights
of action under treaties. 221 That presumption should be rebuttable if
the treatymakers adopt a clear statement in the treaty text or in the
instrument of ratification. To avoid ambiguity, the treatymakers
should use the term “private right of action,” not the term “selfexecuting,” to overcome the presumption.
For other questions related to judicial enforcement, 222 courts
should apply a two-step approach, not a one-step approach (unless
there is explicit language in the treaty text or the instrument of
ratification addressing judicial enforcement in domestic courts). As
noted previously, the justiciability doctrine combines the two-step
approach with the political-judicial concept. 223 In accordance with
justiciability doctrine, courts should apply a treaty interpretation
analysis to ascertain the content and scope of the international
obligation (step one). Then, in step two, courts should apply a
domestic separation-of-powers analysis to determine whether the
judicial branch is competent to enforce the specific treaty obligation
at issue. For the judicial competence question (step two), the
Discussion Draft’s recommended “no presumption” rule is
appropriate. Courts must answer that question on a case-by-case
basis. If the analysis in step two yields a conclusion that courts are
competent to enforce the treaty, the relevant authorities support
judicial enforcement. As the Supreme Court stated recently, “For
once a case or controversy properly comes before a court, judges are
bound by federal law.” 224 A treaty is federal law, unless the treaty is
unconstitutional, or it has been superseded by a later-in-time statute,

221.

See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
781–82 (5th ed. 2003).
222. Other questions arise, for example, when the private litigant is invoking the treaty
as a defense, or he is bringing a claim on the basis of a statutory or common law right of action
and invoking the treaty as a rule of decision.
223. See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text.
224. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1384 (2015).

AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
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or the treatymakers have exercised their Article II power to opt out
of the treaty supremacy rule. The principle that judges “are bound
by federal law” means that they are bound by a treaty that has the
status of federal law, if the particular treaty provision at issue is
within the scope of judicial competence. In such circumstances,
courts should not invoke a fictitious “intent of the treatymakers” to
evade their duty to decide cases in accordance with federal law.
CONCLUSION
In his dissenting opinion in Medellín, Justice Breyer accused the
majority of “hunting the snark.” 225 The snark, presumably, is a
fictitious, non-existent animal. Similarly, in the vast majority of cases,
the treatymakers’ ostensible “intention” to render a treaty selfexecuting or non-self-executing is a fictitious, non-existent intent.
Instead of deciding cases on the basis of a judicially created fictitious
intent, courts should base their self-execution analysis on something
that actually exists. By following the preceding recommendations,
courts could replace a broken doctrine with a doctrine that is
grounded in reality, not judicial fantasy.

225.
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APPENDIX
Varieties of NSE Doctrines*

CongressionalExecutive Concept
President has
authority to execute
SE treaty, but federal
legislation is needed to
authorize President to
execute NSE treaty.

Two-Step Approach

One-Step Approach

Classification of
treaty as SE or
NSE is contingent
upon the content
of the international
obligation.

Classification as SE or
NSE is not contingent
upon the content of the
international obligation.
It hinges on ostensible
"intent of treatymakers"
regarding a purely
domestic question.

Constitutional
Doctrine
(Origin: 1790s)

Intent Doctrine
(Origin: 1920s)

Condition Precedent
Doctrine
(Origin: 1850s)
Fujii Doctrine
(Origin: 1950s)

Federal-State Concept
SE treaty supersedes
conflicting state
law, but NSE treaty
does not.
Political-Judicial
Concept
SE treaty is judicially
enforceable, but
judicial power to
enforce NSE treaties
is restricted.

Justiciability
Doctrine (Origin:
1880s or earlier)

Private Right of Action
Doctrine (Origin: 1970s)
No Private Enforcement
Doctrine (Origin: 1990s)
No Judicial Enforcement
Doctrine (Origin: After
2000???)

*See notes to table on the following page.
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Implicit Constitutional Assumptions Underlying Different
Versions of NSE Doctrine
Constitutional Doctrine: President’s authority to execute treaty is subject
to constitutional, separation of powers limitations. (See notes 51–57 and
accompanying text.)
Justiciability Doctrine: Judicial authority to enforce treaty is subject to
separation of powers limitations, including both constitutional and
prudential limits. (See notes 124–25 and accompanying text.)
Condition Precedent Doctrine: U.S. treatymakers have an affirmative
power to decide that a treaty will not enter into force internationally
until after Congress enacts implementing legislation. (See notes 58–65
and accompanying text.)
Intent Doctrine: U.S. treatymakers have an affirmative power to decide
whether executive officials are authorized to execute a treaty in the
absence of congressional legislation. (See notes 66–84 and
accompanying text.)
Fujii Doctrine: U.S. treatymakers have an affirmative power to decide
whether a treaty supersedes conflicting state laws. (See notes 90–105
and accompanying text.)
Private Right of Action Doctrine: U.S. treatymakers have an affirmative
power to decide whether a treaty creates a private right of action. (See
notes 128–129 and 209–212 and accompanying text.)
No Private Enforcement Doctrine: U.S. treatymakers have an affirmative
power to decide whether a treaty creates rights enforceable by private
litigants in U.S. courts. (See notes 39–40 and 209–212 and
accompanying text.)
No Judicial Enforcement Doctrine: U.S. treatymakers have an affirmative
power to issue a binding directive to courts to bar judicial enforcement
of a treaty that has the status of supreme federal law. (See notes 134–
137 and accompanying text.)
NOTE: The phrase “U.S. treatymakers” refers to the President and
Senate, acting together under the Article II Treaty Power. The
statement that “U.S. treatymakers have an affirmative power” assumes
that they exercise the relevant power in the context of treaty negotiation
and/or Senate consent to ratification.
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